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Abstract 
The knowledge required for action is generally indexical rather than objective. For example, 
a robot that knows the relative position of an object is generally able to go and pick it up; 
he need not know its absolute position. Agents may have very incomplete knowledge of their 
situation in terms of what objective facts hold and still be able to achieve their goals. This 
paper presents a formal theory of knowledge and action, embodied in a modal logic, that handles 
the distinction between indexical and objective knowledge and allows a proper specification of 
the knowledge prerequisites and effects of action. Several kinds of robotics situations involving 
indexical knowledge are formalized within the framework; these examples how how actions can 
be specified so as to avoid making excessive requirements upon the knowledge of agents. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Designing autonomous robots or other kinds of agents that interact in sophisticated 
ways with their environment is hard; you need good tools to do it. Designs should 
be based on well-developed theories of the interactions that agents have with their 
environment. There has been a widespread perception that logic-based formalisms are 
unsuitable for this task because classical ogic can only represent objective knowledge, 
it cannot capture the context-relativity, the “situatedness” of action and of the knowledge 
required for action. In this paper, we will show that this view is inaccurate. We will 
present a logical theory of knowledge and action that does accommodate indexicality 
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and show that it provides a suitable framework for modeling many kinds of interactions 
that typically occur between a robot and its environment. Logic-based theories such as 
ours can help clarify many notions that are used in informal analyses of interaction. No 
doubt such theories do not capture all aspects of situatedness and much work remains to 
be done to show that they can be successfully applied to robot design. But we think that 
after having examined this work, one will agree that it makes an important contribution 
to the theoretical foundations of the field and has significant potential for applicability, 
no matter what kind of architecture turns out to be best for achieving reactive yet 
sophisticated behavior. 
A key feature of agent-environment interaction is incomplete knowledge: agents typi- 
cally know very little about their environment. Many theories of action and most existing 
planners have completely ignored the need to deal with what agents know and need to 
know by unrealistically assuming that agents always have perfect knowledge of the do- 
main under consideration. But in the past decade, Moore 140,411, Morgenstern [ 42,431, 
and other researchers have proposed theories of knowledge and action that do address 
this need. 
For example, it is physically possible for someone to withdraw funds at a teller 
machine by inserting a bank card and pressing a sequence of keys (assuming the 
machine is working, the card is not defective, there is money available, and so on). But 
this a very weak notion; by the same token, it is physically possible for a monkey to 
write a sonnet at a typewriter. To say that an agent is truly able to withdraw funds, we 
would want to insist that the agent know among many other things, his bank identification 
code. The reason this stronger notion of ability is so useful is that it allows us to make 
sense of actions that otherwise seem to have no relevant effect. For example, how else 
to explain an agent who always takes a small piece of paper out his wallet and looks at 
it carefully before pushing the keys on the teller machine? 
To understand actions such as these, we need to consider agents that have knowledge 
about 
l the effects various actions would have upon their knowledge; 
l the knowledge prerequisites of the actions they might do-the conditions under 
which they are able to achieve goals by doing actions. 
Theories such as Moore’s and Morgenstern’s do provide reasonable answers to the 
question of what the relationship between knowledge and action is and have considerably 
advanced our understanding of the issues involved. But many problems remain. This 
work deals with one aspect of the relationship between knowledge and action that has 
been neglected and is inadequately handled by these theories: the fact that the knowledge 
required for action is often relative to the agent’s perspective-that it is often indexicul 
(or relative) knowledge rather than objective knowledge. For example, 
l if a robot knows the relative position of an object he can go and pick it up- 
knowing the absolute position of the object is neither necessary nor sufficient (he 
might not know where he is) ; 
l one can soft-boil an egg if one has a timer-knowing at what time it will be done 
is neither necessary nor sufficient (one may not know what time it is). 
In these cases, the agent has very incomplete knowledge of his situation, at least as far 
as objective facts are concerned, but this does not interfere with his ability to achieve 
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his goals by doing actions. More generally, an agent may have sufficient knowledge to 
be able to achieve his goals even if he does not know 
l where he is; 
l what time it is; 
l which objects are around him; 
l where these objects are located (in absolute terms) ;
l who he is. 
This is the case because the knowledge required for physical interactions with the en- 
vironment is indexical knowledge, knowledge about how one is related to things in 
the environment or to events in one’s history. This should not come as a surprise, 
since agents act upon their environment from a particular perspective, a particular place 
and moment in time. The same action done at different places and times has dif- 
ferent effects. So it makes sense that the prerequisites of an action should involve 
knowledge that is relative to this perspective. Similarly and fortunately, the knowl- 
edge supplied by perception is indexical knowledge. For example, by using his sonar, 
a robot comes to know how far from him an object is (at the current time) ; he 
does not learn anything about the object’s absolute position. Indexicality has of course 
been a central theme of the “situated action” paradigm [5,5 1,531. Several researchers 
have argued that indexical knowledge plays a major role in the operation of reactive 
agents [ 2,521. 
Existing theories of the relationship between knowledge and action cannot handle these 
cases properly, as they do not accommodate he distinction between indexical knowledge 
and objective knowledge. They impose unnecessarily strong knowledge requirements 
upon agents before sanctioning their ability; they tend to require objective knowledge 
when indexical knowledge would be sufficient. They also cannot represent accurately 
the effects of action upon knowledge. We need an account of ability that squares with 
the fact that an agent may be missing very basic facts about his objective situation and 
that of the things around him and still be capable of achieving his goals. The reason we 
care about this is that this form of incomplete knowledge is the norm rather than the 
exception for agents in the world. 
This is not to say that objective knowledge is never necessary for action. Because 
it is independent of the context, it can be stored or communicated without the need 
for adjustments o compensate for changes in the context. It is clear that human agents 
have all sorts of objective knowledge about the world and draw upon a variety of 
external sources of objective knowledge such as textbooks, databases, maps, timetables, 
etc. In hierarchical planning, it is likely that top-levels plans involve actions that are 
specified in a relatively objective way (e.g., in planning a car trip across the province, 
one first decides on what roads to follow and only later on whether to turn right or 
left). What this means is that a theory of knowledge and action must accommodate 
both the indexical knowledge involved in interaction with the physical environment 
and the objective knowledge involved in high-level planning and social interactions. As 
well, it must allow each kind of knowledge to be mapped into the other provided that 
knowledge of the context is available, so that objective knowledge can be exploited in 
physical interactions and indexical knowledge is available for communication, long-term 
storage, etc. 
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1.2. The approach 
We want a theory of knowledge and action that handles the distinction between in- 
dexical and objective knowledge and accounts for indexical knowledge prerequisites and 
effects of action. The approach taken is to develop a quantified modal logic that embod- 
ies the theory. The logic includes primitives that formalize notions of knowledge, time, 
action, and historical necessity-the latter notion is used to capture the physical possi- 
bility of a course of action for an agent. The notion of ability is formalized as a derived 
operator (i.e., defined in terms of the notions mentioned above). The epistemic and tem- 
poral parts of the logic adequately support the representation of indexical knowledge, 
keeping it distinct from objective knowledge. We provide a formal semantics for the 
knowledge operator that handles indexicality; it is a simple and natural extension of the 
standard possible-world semantic scheme for the logic of knowledge [ 18,201. The com- 
plete system permits an adequate characterization of indexical knowledge prerequisites 
and effects of actions in a wide range of circumstances. 
The specification of the theory as a logical system has several advantages. The prop- 
erties that the theory attributes to agents correspond to provably valid sentences of the 
logic; this ensures that the theory is precisely specified. Moreover, since attributions 
of properties to agents emerge as sentences, they can themselves be objects of be- 
lief/knowledge by agents; so for example, not only can you state that if an agent does 
S he will know whether p, but also that the agent knows that if he does 6 he will know 
whether 9. In fact, our theory models not only interactions but also agents’ knowledge 
about interactions. In it, whenever an agent is able to achieve a goal by doing an action, 
he knows that this is the case. Whenever a statement like “if agent a knows rp then a 
can achieve 9 by doing s” is valid in the logic, then this must be known by all agents. 
The provision of a formal semantics clarifies the theory’s claims and the ontological 
commitments involved. Finally, the logic can be used to reason formally about knowl- 
edge, action, and ability-the kind of reasoning a designer might do in ensuring that the 
agent being designed is able to achieve a goal. Our methodology differs little from that 
used by Moore [ 40,4 11, Morgenstern [ 42,431, and others who have previously worked 
on theories of knowledge and action. 
Note that our theory is at the “knowledge level” [ 451, and as such, does not say much 
about agent architecture. While it uses logic, it does not take any representational stance 
(i.e., assume that knowledge is represented by sentence-like entities inside agents); this 
is similar to the position taken by Rosenschein and Kaelbling in their situated automata 
work [ 24,481. But there is an emerging consensus that satisfactory architectural designs 
for agents will need to be based on an adequate theory of agent-environment interaction. 
Our work attempts to provide this kind of foundation. 
A substantial part of our efforts has been devoted to the formalization of various 
application domains within the logical system proposed. This is essential to ensure that 
the theory is truly useful and that it handles adequately the kind of situations that it is 
designed for. Moreover, the formalization of actions involves many decisions that have a 
crucial effect upon what knowledge is required from an agent, but are not settled by the 
theory; for example, decisions concerning the kind of parameters an action should take. 
The applications developed show how actions can be specified so as to avoid making 
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excessive requirements upon the knowledge of agents, and how such specifications can 
be used to prove that an agent is able to achieve a goal by doing an action if he knows 
certain facts. 
Much of our formalization efforts have been directed at a robotics domain, since this 
kind of application provides the most intuitive examples of situations where indexical 
knowledge is sufficient for ability. We will describe in detail our formalization of this 
domain, where a simple robot is involved in various types of interaction with its en- 
vironment. In our formalization, perception does yield indexical knowledge and ability 
to act upon an object does not require knowing which object is involved or what its 
absolute position is. We also show how indexical knowledge and objective knowledge 
can be and must be related in our framework to deal with the use of maps for navigation. 
We discuss the representational issues that arise, which have general relevance to the 
formalization of actions with indexical knowledge prerequisites or effects. 
In the next section, we briefly discuss related work. Then in Section 3, we give an 
overview of the logical system that forms the basis of our framework. The core of the 
paper is Section 4, where we describe our formalization of various types of interactions 
a simple robot has with its environment. Following that, Section 5 briefly describes 
other application domains that have been formalized, in particular cases where temporal 
knowledge is required for ability. Then in Section 6, we argue that the applications 
examined, in particular the ones involving temporal knowledge, provide convincing 
evidence that the distinction between indexical and objective knowledge supported by 
our framework has substantial practical value and that it cannot be done justice within 
existing accounts of ability. We conclude in Section 7 by discussing the contributions 
and limitations of this work, and suggesting various directions for further research; we 
discuss how this work might be applied to the design of autonomous robots and other 
types of agents. 
2. Related work 
This survey is selective and often sketchy; for a more complete discussion, see [ 291. 
2.1. Theories of knowledge and action 
As argued in the introduction, a theory that explains how agents manage to achieve 
their goals by doing actions, and in particular why they perform knowledge acquisition 
actions, must account for the effects of action upon knowledge and for the knowledge 
prerequisites of action; it must include an account of ability as opposed to mere “‘physical 
possibility”. The most influential work in this area is Moore’s theory of knowledge and 
action [ 40,4 11. His framework can be described as a combination of first-order dynamic 
logic (a modal logic of action) [ 131 with an S4 modal logic of knowledge [18,191. 2 
2 Strictly speaking, the framework is not the modal ogic just described, but the encoding in first-order logic 
of the semantics of this modal logic; thus the part of the logic dealing with action is closely related to the 
situation calculus [ 381. 
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On the matter of knowledge prerequisites of action, notice that one may know that an 
action would achieve a goal without knowing how to execute that action; for example, 
one may know that cooking beef bourguignon would impress the party’s guests without 
knowing how to cook beef bourguignon. For Moore, knowing how to do an action 
amounts to knowing what primitive actions that action (description) stands for; knowing 
how to do an action requires having de re as opposed to de ditto knowledge of the 
action. 
Let us review the philosophical lore on this distinction. De re knowledge attributions 
are said to assert the existence of some kind of epistemic relation between the knower 
and some entity. The intuition behind such attributions is that they apply to cases where 
the agent’s knowledge is sufficiently precise to pick up a particular entity, as opposed 
to being about whatever satisfies a description. The latter cases are said to involve mere 
de ditto knowledge. For example, if John is told that someone among his co-workers 
has been selected to be the new manager, but is not told whom, he may then come to 
believe that the new manager (whoever he is) must be happy-a de ditto rather than de 
re belief. If he is later told that the new manager is Paul, he will then come to have a de 
re belief of Paul that he must be happy. Following Hintikka [ 191, knowing who/what 
0 is usually taken to amount to knowing of some x that it is 0 (de re). The question 
of what precisely is required for an agent to have de re knowledge has been the subject 
of much philosophical debate (see [ 281 for a discussion). In AI, the common answer 
has been that having de re knowledge of some entity requires knowing a standard name 
for that entity [26,35], a view shared by Moore as well as the present work. Since 
what standard names refer to must be common knowledge; this means that they must 
be objective, and thus, that de re knowledge must in some sense always be objective 
knowledge. But this can be a bit misleading, as knowing what the relative position of an 
object is or knowing what primitive actions an action stands for hardly qualify as having 
objective knowledge. The domain over which one quantifies matters. In such cases, one 
can at best say that one has “objective” knowledge of a relational property. 
So Moore uses this distinction in his formalization of ability. For atomic actions, his 
account goes as follows: an agent is able to achieve a goal by doing an action if and only 
if he knows what the given action is, and knows of himself that it is physically possible 
for him to do the action next and that his doing the action next necessarily results in 
the goal being achieved. Note that the agent is required to have de re knowledge of 
himself-to know who he is. Complex actions are handled recursively; for instance, an 
agent is said to be able to achieve a goal by doing a sequence of two actions if and 
only if by doing the first action, he is able to achieve the goal of being able to achieve 
the main goal by doing the second action. The agent need not initially know what all 
the actions that make up his plan are; he needs only know that he will know what to do 
next at each step of the plan. Note that in most cases, the specification of an action need 
not say anything explicit about its knowledge prerequisites; these fall out of the theory’s 
general principles and the specification of the conditions under which one knows what 
the action is. 
The requirement that the agent know what the action is has interesting results when the 
action is an instance of a parametrized procedure (e.g. DIAL( COMBINATION( SAFES) ) ) ; 
in many such cases, agents know what the procedure is and one wants to say that an 
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agent knows what the action is if he knows what the arguments are; it is easy to state 
this in Moore’s formalism (technically, one states that the procedure is an epistemi- 
tally rigid function). But note that assuming that an instance of a procedure is known 
whenever one knows what the parameters are is often wrong. For example, whether one 
knows how to PICKUP(BLOCK~) has nothing to do with whether one knows a standard 
name for BLOCKI; it has more to do with whether one knows the relative position of 
BLOCKI, or more generally where BLOCK1 is relative to oneself. One has to be very 
careful as to how one parametrizes the actions, and in many cases, the parameters must 
be indexical descriptions. 
But Moore’s framework does not really accommodate the distinction between indexi- 
cal and objective knowledge. His logic does not handle knowledge that is indexical with 
respect to the agent; it does not capture an agent’s concept of himself, and knowledge 
that involves this concept (e.g., an agent’s knowing that he himself is holding a block). 
So the account requires the agent to know who he is (know a standard name for himself, 
something clearly objective) in order to be judged able to achieve a goal by doing an 
action. This is clearly unnecessary. What need would a very simple agent, say a robot 
insect, have for knowing who he is? Because of this, the formalism cannot really model 
what knowing something under an indexical description amounts to. Yet this seems to 
be an important feature of how reactive agents deal with their environment (see Sec- 
tion 6 for more discussion of this). Moore’s logic also does not handle knowledge about 
absolute times. So for instance, it is not possible to say that after looking at a clock, 
an agent knows what time it is.3 These expressive limitations together with the way 
the account treats parametrized procedures mean that formalizations of various domains 
in Moore’s framework tend to require too much objective knowledge and not enough 
indexical knowledge. 
Let us point out a few other limitations of Moore’s account of ability. Firstly, the 
notion formalized is a highly idealized version of the commonsense notion: one is taken 
as able to achieve a goal only if one knows that doing the action absolutely guarantees 
that the goal will be achieved; just knowing that it is highly likely to achieve the goal is 
not enough. It would be great to have a version of the account that deals with uncertainty, 
but this is not something we attempt in the present work. Secondly, it may be argued that 
ability is not just a matter of knowing what actions to take. For example, does knowing 
how to play a sonata only require knowing which notes to play and does knowing how 
to ride a bicycle only require knowing which movements to make? On the other hand, 
it is not clear that these examples point to some essential flaw in the account; perhaps 
it is just a matter of making explicit the temporal and memory constraints associated 
with the action (e.g., one needs to recover quickly from playing a note, as well as keep 
track of what note to play next). Finally, there are cases in commonsense discourse 
where we individuate actions in terms of their effects rather than in terms of what body 
3 Technically speaking, Moore models knowledge with an accessibility relation that ranges over (instanta- 
neous) world states. He cannot represent knowledge that is indexical with respect to the agent because them. is 
nothing to characterize who the agent thinks he might be in these states. He also cannot represent knowledge 
about absolute times because his states have no absolute time is associated with them. This should become 
clearer after our accounts of knowledge and ability have been introduced. 
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movements or effector commands get executed (e.g., one may say that at the end of 
every working day, a sales representative does the same action no matter where he might 
be, he goes home). But this is a different sense of “doing an action” from the one we 
are concerned with; we are not trying to produce a semantic account of natural language 
discourse about action. 
Let us briefly discuss other theories of knowledge and action. One of the unattractive 
features of the logic of knowledge included in Moore’s framework is that knowledge is 
assumed to be closed under logical consequence. Konolige [ 25 ] has developed a theory 
of knowledge and action, based on an account of knowledge as a predicate on sentences, 
that avoids this defect. 4 His account of ability is essentially a recasting of Moore’s into 
his framework; only the same restricted class of actions is handled. 
A theory that significantly extends this coverage has been developed by Morgenstern 
[ 42,431. It handles both concurrent actions and plans involving multiple agents. Simpler 
cases are treated as in Moore’s. Her account of knowledge is also syntactic, but differs 
significantly from Konolige’s (she does not use the Tarskian approach to the paradoxes 
and there is a single truth predicate for all the languages in the hierarchy). Note that 
knowledge is, in fact, closed under logical consequence in her account. Her argumen- 
tation against classical logics of knowledge is not based on the consequential closure 
problem, but on the claim that they cannot express the weak knowledge prerequisites 
involved in multi-agent planning. For example, if Paul does not know how to fix a leaky 
faucet, but knows that his friend John is somehow able to do it, then he is able to fix 
the faucet by asking John to do it for him. However, our recent work [ 341 undermines 
this argument; we show that the notion of “somehow being able to achieve a goal” can 
in fact be modeled in a possible-world framework. 
Neither Konolige nor Morgenstern recognize the role of indexical knowledge in action; 
their formalisms have the same limitations as Moore’s in this respect. One researcher 
who did recognize it is Haas. In [ 161, he sketches how indexical knowledge might be 
handled in a specification of ability; but he does not formalize his proposals. 
2.2. Theories of indexical knowledge 
There has been a lot of work on indexical knowledge in philosophy, but we can 
only mention a few references here (see [29] ). Our account of indexical knowledge is 
inspired from Lewis’s view that having a belief involves ascribing a property to oneself 
and the current time [37]. In [461, Perry argues convincingly that indexicality is an 
essential feature of propositional attitudes. 
Let us say a bit more about some recent work by Grove [ 141 and Grove and Halpern 
[ 151, where they propose a logic of knowledge that does handle indexicality. Their 
account of knowledge is quite similar to ours; in fact, their semantics is essentially 
the same as ours. However, their work is more narrowly focussed than ours; they do 
not account for action and its relationship to knowledge, and only handle time in a 
4 Note however that such “syntactic” accounts have been claimed to have the opposite defect, that is, to 
individuate knowledge states ton finery [361; for instance, it is far from clear that a belief that 9 and C,O’ is 
any different from a belief that ‘p’ und rp. 
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limited way. On the other hand, their work is technically very thorough; they discuss 
several ogical systems with varying degrees of expressiveness, both propositional and 
first-order, and they provide complete axiomatizations and complexity results5 They 
also develop an appealing approach to quantification i to epistemic ontexts that permits 
a resolution of the ambiguity of de re reports with respect o the way the knower is 
referring to the object. 
2.3. Reactive behavior and situated action 
It has been argued that indexicality plays an important role in how agents manage to 
react in a timely manner to changing environmental conditions (e.g., avoid collisions 
with moving objects). Let us look at some recent work on reactive agents where this 
comes out. This is a promising application area for our work. 
The classical AI paradigm with respect to the production of intelligent behavior 
involves a smart planner that searches for a plan that achieves the agent’s goal and 
a dumb executor that carries out the plan in a mechanical way. In recent years, there 
has been a definite movement owards exploring alternatives to this paradigm. It is 
felt that because of the emphasis it places on search for complete plans, classical 
deliberative planning is too slow for producing reactive behavior. Moreover, it is not 
sufficiently grounded in perception; much of the effort expended on constructing a plan 
may be wasted if environmental conditions change in the meantime. The alternative 
architectures proposed achieve reactivity by emphasizing environment monitoring and the 
selection of actions appropriate to conditions; the focus is on developing a sophisticated 
executor. 
Agre and Chapman [2,3] have been among the most radical in their reevaluation of 
the classical paradigm. Their views have been influenced by anthropological theories of 
action [ 1,531. They emphasize the complexity of the real situations in which action 
occurs, the uncertainty of the information the agent may have about them, and the need 
for reactivity. This leads them to argue that the production of most activity does not 
involve the construction and manipulation of explicit representations of the world; the 
associated computational costs are just too prohibitive. They say that: 
Rather than relying on reasoning to intervene between perception and action, we 
believe activity mostly derives from very simple sorts of machinery interacting 
with the immediate situation. This machinery exploits regularities in its interac- 
tion with the world to engage in complex, apparently planful activity without 
requiring explicit models of the world. [2, p. 2681 
The architecture they propose involves peripheral modules for perception and effector 
control and a central system that mediates between the two. They argue that combina- 
tional networks, that is, circuits computing logic functions, can form an adequate central 
system for most activities; thus in such cases, the central system has no state. They 
5 Interestingly, their results seem to show that the conryiexity of deciding whether a sentence is valid is 
no worse in systems that accommodate he distinction between objective and indexical knowledge than in 
comparable systems that do not. 
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have built various application systems to provide support for their analysis. One of these 
systems, called Pengi, plays a videogame where one controls a penguin that navigates 
in a maze, pushes away ice blocks, and confronts malicious “killer bees” [ 21. 
From our point of view, the most interesting elements of Agre and Chapman’s scheme 
are their notions of indexical-functional entities and aspects. 6 They claim that traditional 
domain representations involving objective facts such as “(AT BLOCK-213 427 991)” 
are inappropriate because they do not make reference to the agent’s situation or goals. 
They see the machinery in their networks as registering indexical-functional entities 
such as “the block I’m pushing” and indexical-functional aspects such as “the bee I 
intend to clobber is closer to the projectile than I am”. These entities and aspects are 
indexical because they depend on the agent’s situation; they are also functional because 
they depend on his purposes. Clearly, Agre and Chapman find the notion of indexical 
information useful in designing their robots and explaining how they behave. However, 
they do not propose any forma1 version of this modeling scheme. 
Subramanian and Woodfill [52] have recently proposed an interesting account of 
reactive agent architectures and the role indexical representations play in them; their 
work includes a computational complexity analysis that attempts to trace the source 
of the efficiency gains associated with the use of indexical representations. To model 
the world as viewed by reactive agents, they use a version of the situation calcu- 
lus [38] with a vocabulary that includes indexical terms. The logical constant Now 
is used to refer the current situation. Constraints are introduced to ensure that ev- 
ery situation has at most one predecessor and the function Before is used to refer 
to a situation’s predecessor (e.g., Before(Now) refers to the situation prior to the 
most recent action). Domain-dependent indexical terms, such as This-Block, are also 
used. Subramanian and Woodfill show how the kind of indexical control rules that 
determine what a reactive agent will do next (one-step planning) can be specified in 
this framework. This is also done for plan-monitoring rules, which are used to de- 
duce what should be the case after an action has been performed. Their complexity 
analysis of this kind of setting traces the efficiency gains associated with the use of 
indexical representations to the fact that indexical theories can be propositionalized 
without the usual combinatorial explosion because they do not quantify over all en- 
tities of the relevant type; instead, they refer to the entities involved indexically. In 
their words: “the power of using these indexical terms is that it gives us implicit 
quantification.” 
Independently of whether this analysis is correct, it must be noted that Subramanian 
and Woodfill’s framework inherits most of the limitations of the ordinary situation 
calculus, in particular, its inability to handle knowledge acquisition actions. Moreover, 
the semantics fails to distinguish between the context dependence of indexical terms 
and the simple world-dependence of non-rigid constants. Finally, the theory does not 
account for the distinctive logical behavior of indexical terms, for example, the fact that 
the past is determined while the future is not. 
h This is Agre and Chapman’s termmology. There arc of course no such things as indexical (or agent-relative) 
entities; but there are indexical (or agent-relative) concepts or notions of things. 
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Another conception of how reactive behavior can be produced has been proposed 
by Rosenschein and Kaelbling [ 24,481. Their approach is of particular interest to us 
because a logic is used to specify reactive agents and the environments in which they 
operate. Design tools based on the logic are also developed; these tools facilitate the 
specification of complex agents and allow high-level specifications to be “compiled” 
into circuit-level ones. 
The architecture they propose for reactive agents [ 231 also avoids formal manipulation 
of explicit representations. It involves a perceptual component and an action selection 
component, both of which may have state (registers). They also argue that the lack 
of explicit representations does not mean that one loses the ability to ascribe semantic 
content to machine states. They propose an alternative way of doing this-the situated 
automata view. It involves viewing the agent and its environment as coupled automata. 
A machine state contains the information that cp (i.e., in that state, the machine knows 
that sp) if given the state transition functions of the machine and world, the fact that 
the machine is in that state implies that 5p must be the case. For example, the fact 
that a certain wire in a robot carries a “1” would mean that there is an object within 
a certain radius of his position, if given the state transition functions, the wire can 
only be carrying a “1” if there is an object within that radius. Thus the information 
content of a machine state is defined in terms of how it is correlated to environmental 
conditions. 
Rosenschein and Kaelbling do not discuss the role of indexical knowledge in the 
production of reactive behavior. Their logic suffers from the same kind of expressive 
limitations as Moore’s with respect to indexicality; it does not handle knowledge that 
is indexical with respect to the agent, and while it accommodates temporally indexical 
knowledge, it does not handle temporally objective knowledge. This may come as a 
surprise because their formalization of examples such as the one involving a robot 
that keeps track of whether a moving object is within shouting distance in [481 uses 
many indexical-sounding propositions. But their logic does not really model all of that 
indexicality. When indexical-sounding domain-dependent symbols are used, it’s easy to 
lose track of what the formalism really handles. However, their work strongly suggests 
that a theory of knowledge and action that handles the distinction between indexical 
and objective knowledge would be very useful for producing better accounts of reactive 
behavior and better tools for the design of reactive agents. 
3. A logic of indexical knowledge, action, and ability 
In this section, we briefly review a formal theory of indexical knowledge, action and 
ability, and some of its properties. A much more detailed examination of the theory, 
including a discussion of the general issues involved can be found in [ 29,331. Here, we 
simply present the theory in sufficient detail to underwrite the applications of the next 
two sections. 
Our theory is formulated in a many-sorted first-order modal logic with equality. We 
assume familiarity with conventional first-order logic as in [39], and at least some 
acquaintance with the standard apparatus of modal logics, as described in [ 211 or [ 81. 
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3.1. syntax 
We want to be able to express attributions of indexical knowledge in our logic, for 
example, that Rob knows that he himself was holding a cup five minutes ago. In such 
cases, what is known is a “proposition” that is relative. It may be relative to the knower, 
or to the time of the knowing, or perhaps to other aspects of the context. To handle this, 
our language includes two special terms: self, which denotes the current agent, and now, 
which denotes the current time; these terms are called primitive indexiculs. Non-logical 
(domain-dependent) symbols may also depend on the current agent and time for their 
interpretation, for example, UPHOLDING may express the fact that the current agent 
is currently holding something-we say that such symbols are non-primitive indexicals. 
Our semantics handles this by interpreting terms and formulas with respect to indices, 
which consist of a possible-world, modeling the objective circumstances, and an agent 
and time, modeling the context. Note that self and now are not intended to be formal 
counterparts of similar sounding English words and behave differently from any such 
words (more about this shortly). 
The language we use is called LIKA and as any first-order logical language, it divides 
syntactically into terms and formulas. ’ The terms here, however, are of four different 
sorts: terms for ordinary individuals (as usual), temporal terms, agent terms, and action 
terms. For each of these four sorts, there are both variables and function symbols (that 
is, functions whose values will be of the proper sort) and as usual, constants are taken 
to be 0-ary function symbols. We will use the metavariables V, F, and 8 to range over 
variables, function symbols, and terms respectively, with superscripts i, t, a, and d used 
to indicate the sort: individual, temporal, agent, and action respectively. So, for example, 
ut stands for a temporal variable, and od stands for an action term. Syntactically, terms 
are formed in the obvious way, with the following restrictions: firstly, only temporal 
function symbols may take temporal terms as arguments, and secondly, action terms 
cannot appear as arguments to function symbols of any sort. 
The atomic formulas include predications using predicate symbols and terms, written 
R(8,,... ,19,), which are used to assert that 81, . . . ,8, stand in static relation R at the 
current time and for the current agent. We also have equality expressions (01 = 02)) 
between terms of the same sort, as well as expressions of temporal precedence (0: < 
0:). Finally, Does( ed, 0’) is used to assert that the current agent does action ed starting 
from the current time and ending at time 8’. 
For non-atomic formulas, we have negations, implications, and universal quantifica- 
tions, and all the standard abbreviations (such as disjunctions; see below). Finally, if CP 
is a formula, then so are At( 8’, p), By(P, p), Ihow( and 0~. At(h)‘, p) means 
that p holds at time et, that is, when 8’ is taken to be the current time. By( P, p) means 
that q holds when P is taken to be the current agent. Know(p) is used to say that 
the current agent knows at the current time that q. If Q contains indexicals, Know(~) 
should be taken as attributing indexical knowledge-knowledge the agent has about 
himself and the current time. For example, KIIOW(~XHOLDING(X)) could mean that 
’ LIKA stands for “Language of Indexical Knowledge and Action”. In [29], we used the name &de, instead 
of LIKA. 
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the agent knows that he himself is currently holding something. Finally, q qp is used to 
say that (p is historically necessary, that is, that it must hold, given everything that has 
happened up to now. This completes the syntactic specification of the language. 
The notions of free variable, bound variable, and term that is free for a variable in a 
formula are assumed to have their usual definition. We use (p{v H 6) to stand for the 
result of substituting 6 for all free occurrences of v in (p, provided that u and B belong 
to the same sort. 
All symbols of the language other than the function symbols and the predicate symbols 
are considered to be logical symbols, and will have a fixed interpretation. I  the examples 
of the next section, we will introduce domain-dependent function or predicate symbols 
(with names like POS or HOLDING) as well as axioms governing their interpretation. 
3.2. Semantic structures 
The terms and formulas of LZKA are understood in terms of the following semantic 
components: d,I,I,D, W,@, -c, M, A, and K. Instead of a single domain of discourse, 
we have non-empty domains for each sort: a set A of agents, a set 7 > A of individuals, 
a set 7 of time points, and a set 2) of primitive actions. The terms of LZKA are taken 
to refer to elements of these domains, and quantification is handled in the usual way. 
W is a set of temporally extended possible worlds. As explained earlier, we handle 
indexicals by interpreting terms and formulas with respect o indices, which are triples 
consisting of a world, an agent, and a time; so & = W x A x 7 is the set of indices. We 
take a, i, t, d, w, and e (possibly subscripted, primed, etc.), as ranging over arbitrary 
elements of A, 1, 7, D, W, and E respectively. The By and At operators are used 
to change the agent and time component of the index respectively. The denotations of 
terms and the truth of predications are handled in the obvious way using a function Q, 
which, at each index, maps function symbols to functions over the appropriate domains 
and predicate symbols to relations over the appropriate domains. 
Turning now to the temporal aspects, formulas containing < are understood in terms 
of -x, which is a relation over 7 whose intended interpretation is “is earlier than”. M 
is a family of accessibility relations-one for each time point-that is used to interpret 
the historical necessity operator 0. Intuitively, w zt w* if and only if w and w* differ 
only in what happens after time t. Formulas containing Does are interpreted in terms of 
A C 2) x I x 7, which determines which actions are done by which agents in which 
worlds over which time intervals: (d, (w,a, ts), te) E A if and only if action d is done 
by agent a from time ts to time b in world w. 
Finally, our semantics for knowledge is a simple generalization of the stan- 
dard possible-world scheme [20,27 1. The knowledge accessibility relation K is 
taken to hold over indices rather than plain possible worlds: K 5 &*. Informally, 
((w,a, t), (~‘,a’, t’)) E K if and only if as far as agent a at time t in world w knows, 
it may be the case that w’ is the way the world actually is and he is a’ and the current 
time is t’. Thus, we model the knowledge state of an agent at a time in a world by a 
set of indices, which characterizes not only which worlds are compatible with what the 
agent knows, but also which points of view upon these worlds are compatible with what 
he knows. In other words, we allow an agent o be uncertain ot only about what world 
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he is in, but also about who he is and what time it is. 
3.3. Denotation and satisfaction 
More formally, we have the following: a semantic structure M is a tuple 
An assignment is a function that maps variables into elements of the domain appropriate 
to them. g{u w x} is the assignment that is identical to g except that it maps variable 
u into the entity x. 
The denotation of a term 13 in a structure M at an index e = (w, a, t) under an 
assignment g, written [f9jJFg 1s defined as follows (from now on, we omit the structure 
under consideration when it is clear from context): 
. uUJle,$ = g(u). 
0 [selfjle,, = a, 
l [nowj,,g = t, 
0 [F(B,,... ,~n,=.~ =~(~,e)(ue~n,,,...,us,n,,,). 
We can now define what it means for a formula +CJ to be satisjed by a structure M, 
an index e = (w,a, t), and an assignment g, which we write M,e,g /= p: 
0 e,g + R(#,. . .,e;) iff (uel;n,,,, . . , uebn,,,) E @(Re), 
l e, g + Does(Bd, 0’) iff A( pd],,,, e, uetn,,,), 
. e,g t= 4 = 02 iff [[h n,,, =ue2n,,,, 
l e, g + 0; < 0: iff ue; De,, 4 ue:n,,,, 
l e,g /= lye iff it is not the case that e,g /= 9, 
l e, g k (91 > ~2) iff either it is not the case that e,g k cp~, or e,g /= ~2, 
l e, g k Vusp iff for every entity x in the domain appropriate to u, e, g{u H x} + (D, 
l e, g + At(Bf, P) iff (w, a, [et],,,), g I= 50, 
l e, g t= By(e”, 40) iff (w, ueq,,,, t), g k 50, 
l e, g + Know(q) iff for all e’, such that (e, e’) E K, e’, g b q, 
l e,g k 0~ iff for all w* such that w Et w*, (~*,a, t),g /= C,D. 
A formula q is satis$able if there exists a structure M, index e, and assignment g, 
such that M, e, g + 9. A formula p is valid (written k 4p) if it is satisfied by all 
structures, indices, and assignments. 
As mentioned earlier, our logic is not intended to be a formalization of the behavior 
of English indexicals; we see it as a specification language, a tool for modeling how 
agents interact with their environment. In English, there are true indexicals (I, you, now, 
here, etc.), which refer to aspects of the utterance context no matter where they appear, 
and there are quasi-indexicals/quasi-indicators [ 71 (I myself, you yourself, he himself, 
etc.), which are used to report that an agent has an indexical mental state. The behavior 
of our primitive indexicals self and now displays characteristics of both categories. When 
self occurs outside the scope of Know or By, it behaves like the English indexical “I” 
and when now occurs outside the scope of Know or At, it behaves like the English 
indexical “now”. In the scope of Know on the other hand, self and now behave like 
quasi-indexicals-there are no temporal quasi-indexicals in English, but one can imagine 
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how a temporal analog of “he himself’ would work. Finally, when self occurs in the 
scope of By and when now occurs in the scope of At, they behave like pronouns that 
are bound by the operator; this is similar to the way in which an expression like “the 
day before” depends on surrounding temporal operators as in “tomorrow, it will be the 
case that the day before, I wrote this line”. We wanted to keep the logic simple and 
allow typical assertions about knowledge and action to be expressed concisely. This led 
to the chosen design. These features come at the cost of a simple relationship to English. 
But we feel that the logical behavior of our primitive indexicals is easily understood 
once one realizes it is different from that of any English analogs. This is not to say that 
formalizing the behavior of English indexicals is uninteresting. In fact, we think that 
our framework can be used as a foundation to 
sensitivity of language to that of mental states 
Section 7.2. 
3.4. Constraints 
build a model that relates the context 
and action. We return to this topic in 
To ensure that the semantics adequately models the notions that we are trying to cap- 
ture (knowledge, historical necessity, etc.), we impose various constraints on semantic 
structures. When we speak of a valid or satisfiable formula we always mean relative to 
semantic structures that satisfy these constraints. Here we will simply list the constraints 
without justification (and minimal explanation) : 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
S4 epistemic logic. K must be reflexive and transitive. 
Linear time logic. 4 must be a strict total order, that is, transitive, connected, 
and irreflexive. *
Start time is before end time. If (d, (w,a,t,),b) E A, then ts 5 te. 
Historical necessity is an X5 operator. For all t E 7, zt must be an equivalence 
relation. 
Possibilities do not increase over time. If w at2 w* and ti 3 t2, then w zt, w*. 
Equivalent worlds support he same basic facts and knowledge. If w zt w*, then, 
letting e = (w,a, t) and e* = (~*,a, t), it must be the case that 
(a) for any predicate R, @(R, e*) = @(R, e), 
(b) for any function symbol F, @(F, e*) = @(F, e), 
(c) for any e’, (e*, e’) E K iff (e, e’) E K. 
Equivalent worlds support he same actions. 
(a) If w Et, w*, then A(& (w*,a,t,),t,) iff A(d, (w,a,t,),t,), 
(b) if w zt w* and ts -: t, then 
there exists te such that t + t, and A(d, (w,artS),te) 
if and only if 
there exists t: such that t 4 t: and A(d, (w*,a,t,), t:). 
* A relation R is connected if and only if for any x1 and x2. either x1 Rx2 or XI = x1 or xzRxl ; a relation R 
is irreflexive if and only if for no x is it the case that xRx. 
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(8) Persistent memory and awareness of actions. If ((w,a,t), (~‘,a’, t’)) E K 
and t, 3 t, then there exists a time ti, where ti 3 t’, such that 
((w,a, tr), (w’,a’, tb)) E K and if dfd, (w,a,t,), t) then d(d, (w’,a’, tb), t’). 
See [ 331 for discussion of these constraints. 
3.5. Abbreviations 
To simplify writing formulas in i&X, it is convenient to use certain abbreviations or 
notational conventions. Firstly, we assume the usual definitions for V, A, c, 3, #, >, 6, 
def 
and 2. We also introduce a dual to 0: Osp = -O~cp. Next, using the operator By, we 
define a more common version of Know that specifies which agent knows the given 
proposition; similar definitions are assumed for Does and other operators that have yet 
to be introduced (Res, Can, etc.): 
Know(B”,q) ~fBy(8”,Know((p)), 
and similarly for Does, Res, Can, etc. 
We have also developed a set of definitions that make it easy to state the occurrence of 
a large class of complex actions. We first define a new syntactic category, that of action 
expressions. We use the syntactic variable S to represent members of this category. The 
category is defined by the following BNF rule: 
It includes action terms, which represent simple actions, the noOp action which takes 
no time and changes nothing, (St ; 8,)) which represents the sequential composition of 
the actions St and 192, and if( rp, 61, &), which represents the action that consists in 
doing action St if the condition rp holds, and in doing action 82 otherwise. 
We inductively extend Does to take action expression arguments as follows: 
l Does(noOp, 0’) dzf (8’ = now); 
l Does((&;&),t9’) dzf 3ui(Does(S,,v:) A 3uk(u: = 19’ A At(vi,Does(&,uk)))), 
provided that ui and vz are distinct and do not occur anywhere in f?‘, 81, or &; 
l Does(if(~,SI,&),@) “zf (rpADoes(G1,6*)) V (-9~Does(&,@)). 
We also introduce the following abbreviations for action expressions: 
. ak d;f noOp, if k = 0, 
(~5;6~-‘), if k > 0; 
l iffhen( q, 8) “zf if(p, 6, noOp); 
def 
l whi’ek(v’6) = 
noop, if k = 0, 
iffhen(qp, (8; whilek-1 (~,a))), if k > 0. 
Note that the numbers-k (E IV) in the above are not part of the language, and so cannot 
be quantified over. Also the last abbreviation above is a bounded form of “while loop”; 
properly capturing an unbounded form is problematic in the language as it stands. 
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Let US also define some dynamic-logic-style operators that will be used in our for- 
malization of ability.9 AfterNee(S, 4p), which is intended to mean “+T must hold after 
s”, is defined inductively as follows: 
l Af%erNee( Bd, p) dgf EM~~(Does(~~,v’) > At(u’,p)), where ut is a temporal vari- 
able that does not occur free in (p; 
l AfterNec( noOp, p) dzf 40; 
l AfterNec((&;&),gp) ef AfterNec( 81, AfterNec( 62, cp) ) ; 
def 
l AfterNec(if(pc,61,&),q) = 
(4~~ IJ AfterNM&,qP)) A C-G 3 AfterNM&,pP)). 
In terms of this, we define PhyPoss( 6)) which is intended to mean that it is “physically 
possible” for self to do action S next (even though he may not be able to it because he 
does not know what primitive actions S stands for), and Res( 8, cp), read as “8 results 
in cp”, which means that S is physically possible and 4p must hold after S: 
l PhyPoss( 6) dzf yAfterNec( S, False) ; 
. Res(&p) %if PhyPoss(S) A AfterNec(S,4p); 
Trne (False) stands for some tautology (contradiction). 
Let us also define a few additional operators: 
l Kwhether ( q p) Ef Know(q) v Know; 
l DoneWhen( 6, sp) dzf 3u~3u:( ut - e now A At(u~,Does(S,u~) A 4p)), provided that 
ut and ui are distinct and do not occur anywhere in 5p or S; 
l SomePast( VP) dzf 3u’(u’ < now A At(u’, cp)), where ut does not occur free in 9; 
Kwhether( a) means that self knows whether (p holds; DoneWhen( 8, sp) means that 
self has just done S and that cp was true when he started; and SomePast means that 
q~ held at some point in the past. 
3.6. Ability 
We base our formalization of ability on that of Moore [40], which in spite of its 
relative simplicity, does get at the essential connection between the ability of agents to 
achieve goals and the knowledge they have about relevant actions. It is simpler than his 
because we do not attempt o handle indefinite iteration (while-loop actions). Moore’s 
formalization of this case is actually defective because it does not require the agent to 
know that the action will eventually terminate. We leave this case for future research. 
Since we are not treating indefinite iteration, we can simply define ability in terms of 
the other constructs of the logic as follows: 
l Can(&q) zf CanDo A Know(AfterNec(S,qp)); 
l CanDo( ed) Ef 3ud Know ( ud = ed) A Know (PhyPoss ( fId) ) , where action variable 
ud does not occur free in Bd; 
’ These definitions are a bit different from the ones given in [ 29,311. The ones given here make the operators 
behave xactly as their dynamic logic [ 131 analogs. The differences are discussed in [ 331. 
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CanDo( noOp) “Lf True; 
CanDo(&;&) Ef CanDo AKnow(AfterNec(S1,CanDo(S2))); 
CanDo(if(cp,&,&)) zf (Know(~)ACanDo(&))V(Know(~~)ACanDo(&)). 
definition says that the agent is able to achieve the goal p by doing action 6, 
formally Can( S, rp), if and only if he can do action 6 and knows that after doing 6, the 
goal p must hold. CanDo is defined inductively. The first case takes care of simple 
actions-actions that are represented by action terms. It says that self can do a simple 
action Bd if and only if he knows what that action is and knows that it is physically 
possible for him to do it. Note that the definition involves quantifying-in over the class 
of primitive actions (e.g. “send grasping signal to hand”), as opposed to arbitrary action 
descriptions. The second case handles the noOp action, which trivially holds. The third 
case handles sequentially composed actions: self can do (Si ; 82) if and only if he can 
do 61 and knows that after doing it he will be able to do 62. The final case takes care 
of conditional actions: self can do if( qc, 61,&) if and only if he either knows that the 
condition po,. holds and can do 81, or knows that it does not hold and can do 82. lo 
Note that we eliminate Moore’s requirement that the agent know who he is; instead, 
we require indexical knowledge. Thus, in the simple action case we require that the 
agent know what the action is, that he know that it is physically possible for himself 
to do it, and that he know that if he himself does it, the goal will necessarily hold 
afterwards. Mere de re knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for being able to 
achieve a goal; we discuss this further and give a concrete example in Section 4.2. 
Also, as discussed in Section 5, the fact that our account of ability is based on a more 
expressive temporal logic has important advantages when dealing with actions whose 
prerequisites or effects involve knowledge of absolute times and knowing what time it 
is. 
3.7. Properties of the logic 
In this subsection, we list some properties of the logic of LIKA that are used in the 
proofs of the robotics applications of the next section. We show that the logic indeed 
satisfies these properties in [ 29,331, where we also discuss their significance. 
The basis of our logic, that is, the part concerned with first-order logic with equality, 
is standard (the axiomatization in [ 391 can be used) with one exception: the “axiom” of 
specialization is restricted to prevent non-rigid terms from being substituted into modal 
contexts. This yields the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.1 (Specialization). k Vv(o 3 fp{ v ++ 19}, provided that 8 is free for v in 
cp, no occurrence of a function symbol gets substituted into the scope of a Know, At, 
or By operatol; no occurrence of self gets substituted into the scope of Know or By, 
and no occurrence of now gets substituted into the scope of Know or At. 
I” This way of defining Can is preferable to the one in [ 29.3 I ] as it separates the knowledge prerequisites 
involving the goal from the rest; this makes it easier to prove results involving complex actions; see 1331 for 
further discussion. 
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Knowledge obeys the following principles in our logic: 
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Proposition 3.2. + Know(q+ > ~2) > (Know(qp1) > Know(qp2)). 
Proposition 3.3. If /= 4p. then + Know ( cp) .
Proposition 3.4. + Know( q~) 2 rp. 
Proposition 3.5. t= Know(q0) > Know(Know(q)). 
Proposition 3.6. k Vu Know( q~) 3 Know( By). 
Note that our handling of indexical knowledge affects how the above statements hould 
be read. For instance, Proposition 3.5 says that if the agent knows that Q, then he knows 
that he himself currently knows that 40; Va( Know( a, p) > Know( a, Know( a, 40)  ) is 
not valid. 
We say that a formula (p is future-blind if and only if 5p contains no occurrences of the 
At operator or the Does predicate outside the scope of a Know operator except in forms 
that can be represented as SomePast and DoneWhen. The following proposition says 
that a future-blind formula (i.e., one that does not talk about the future) is historically 
necessary if and only if it is true: 
Proposition 3.7. b q q = q, provided that rp is future-blind. 
Finally, we will need the following properties of Can: 
Proposition 3.8. rfb pi > Can(&,(p,), then b Can(Sl,pi) > Can((&;&).rp,). 
Proposition 3.9. k Can( 8, cp) > Can( S, Know( (p) ). 
Proposition 3.10. 
+ Can(if((oc,4,~22),rPg) 
= (Kn~w(rp,) ACan(Sl,(p,)) V (Know(~q+) ACan(a29P8Dg)). - 
Formalizing a simple robotics domain 
In the previous section, we briefly reviewed a theory of indexical knowledge, action, 
and ability (described in detail in [ 331). We claim that this theory forms an adequate 
framework for the formalization of actions involving indexical knowledge prerequisites 
or effects. Let us now substantiate this claim. We will formalize a robotics domain 
within the theory and prove that a robot is able to achieve certain goals by doing certain 
actions provided that he knows various facts. We will argue that our framework allows 
a much more accurate modeling of these cases than frameworks that ignore indexicality. 
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As will become clear, the framework we provide does not turn the formalization 
of actions that may have indexical knowledge prerequisites or effects into a trivial 
task. Many decisions must still be made in developing a formalization that have a 
crucial bearing on its adequacy from the point of view of how much and what kind of 
knowledge it requires from an agent; for example, decisions as to which parameters a 
procedure should take. What we provide on this front is some general advice on what 
to watch for, as well as the exemplary value of the situations that we formalize. Our 
central admonition in this respect is that one should be careful not to impose excessive 
knowledge requirements upon agents in formalizing actions; in particulal; one should 
merely require indexical knowledge, as opposed to objective knowledge, when that is 
s@cient. Together with our formalization of the examples, we provide a discussion of 
how this guideline has been put into practice. 
4.1. The domain 
Our domain involves a robot, call him ROB, that moves about on a two-dimensional 
grid. Since our purpose is not to model situations where multiple agents interact, but 
to present and justify our account of indexical knowledge and action, our formalization 
will be based on the assumption that the robot is the only source of activity in the 
domain. We take our robot to have the following repertory of basic actions (primitives 
of his architecture): he may move forward by one square, he may turn right or left 90”, 
he may sense whether an object is on the square where he is currently positioned and if 
there is one, what shape it has, and he may pick up an object from the current square 
or put down the object he is holding on the current square. It should be clear that in 
spite of the simplicity of this domain, it contains analogs to a large number of problems 
faced by real robotic agents. For instance, one can view objects of particular shapes as 
landmarks and the robot can then navigate by recognizing such landmarks. We assume 
that there are no physical obstacles to the robot’s movements; in particular, an object 
being on a square does not prevent the robot from being on it too (one can imagine the 
robot as standing over the object). Finally, note that the formalization does not model 
the uncertainty involved in predicting the effects of actions and acquiring knowledge by 
sensing; this limitation would have to be addressed for the framework to be applicable 
to real robotics problems. 
4.2. Ability to manipulate an object 
The indexicality of action manifests itself in many ways in this domain. One key way 
is that a robot can act upon (manipulate) an object if he knows where that object is 
relative to himself, he need not know either the object’s absolute position or his own. 
First consider a simple instance of this where the robot wants to pick up an object and is 
actually positioned where that object is. Relevant aspects of the domain are formalized 
by making various assumptions, ” most of which have to do with the types of action 
” Assumptions arc essentially non-logical axioms in a theory of a particular domain (they are not part of the 
logic proper). In reasoning within a theory, we only deal with semantic structures where the assumptions come 
out true. Note that due to this, assumptions not only hold at time now, but at all times, and it is common knowl- 
edge I 181 that this is the case (i.e., everyone knows it, everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on). 
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involved. The following assumption specifies the effects of the action PICKUP: 
89 
Assumption 4.1 (Effects of PICKUP). 
~VJX(~BJECT(X) APOS(X) =~~~~A+HoLDING(Y) 
3 R~s (PICKUP, HOLDING(X) ) ) . 
Definition 4.2. here Ef Pos( self) 
It says that if some object x is positioned where the agent currently is and he is 
not currently holding anything, then his doing the action PICKUP next will result in his 
holding X. ** 
This means that under these conditions, it is both physically possible for him to 
do PICKUP, and his doing so necessarily results in his holding the object. In fact, 
we assume that all basic actions are always possible. The view adopted is that such 
actions characterize ssentially internal events which may have various external effects 
depending on the circumstances. l3 We also assume that agents always know how to do 
basic actions, that is, know what primitive actions they denote. This is formalized as 
follows: 
Assumption 4.3 (Basic actions are known). 
+ zldKnow(d = IP), 
where ed E {PICKUP, PUTDOWN, FORWARD, RIGHT, LEFT, SENSE}. 
We also make various frame assumptions for PICKUP (i.e., assumptions about what 
does not change as a result of the action). The following says that when the agent does 
PICKUP, the positions of all things must remain unchanged: 
Assumption 4.4 (PICKUP does not affect ~0s). 
+ VXVJI(POS(X) = p XI A&~N~IZ(PICKUP,POS(X) =p)). 
We also assume that PICKUP does not affect the orientation of anything and that 
unheld objects that are not where the agent is remain unheld after the action; these 
assumptions are specified analogously to the one above and we omit them here. 
Now clearly, just having de re knowledge of some object is insufficient for being able 
to pick it up; something must be known about the object’s position. Perhaps there are 
domains where as soon as an agent knows which object is involved, he would know 
I2 Even though we are specifically talking about the agent and time of the context in the above, the attribution 
in fact applies to all agents and times, since it is assumed that the assertion is valid (i.e., satisfied at all 
indices), and it is a property of our logic that if k (p, then b VaVtBy(a, At( t, (p) ). If several agents were 
involved, we might have to formalize the domain differently. 
I3 For instance, Assumption 4.1 only specifies what happens when PICKUP is done under the conditions 
stated; what its effects are in other circumstances is not addressed. 
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how to get to it (or how to find out) ; in such a case, one might want to suppress 
all aspects of the process by which the agent determines the object’s relative position 
and navigates to it, and thus one might develop a formalization where the formula 
in Proposition 4.5 turns out to be valid. However, this is clearly not the usual case; 
agents often fail to know where objects are. Our formalization reflects this; it models 
the situation at a level of detail sufficient to account for what agents need to know 
about the position of objects they want to manipulate. So the following proposition 
holds: 
Proposition 4.5. p EIXKIIOW( OBJECT( X) ) 3 Can( PICKUP, 3x HOLDING(X) ). 
Proof. Consider a structure where e, g + K~OW(~BJECT(X)) but e, g 1 
KIIOW( ~X(OBJECT(X) A POS(X) = here)), i.e., the agent the agent knows of 
some object, but does not know that this object is here, in fact, does not know 
that any object is here. Let there be an index e’ be such that (e,e’) E K and 
e’, g /= Does(PICKUP, t) A lAt( t, 3x HOLDING(X)). This is consistent with As- 
sumptions 4.1 and 4.3. It is easy to see that the above implies that e, g h 
Know(AfterNec(PICKUP, 3x HOLDING(X))) (using the fact that zt must be reflex- 
ive), i.e., the agent does not know that after he does PICKUP, he must be holding 
something. So the agent is not able to achieve the goal by doing PICKUP and the 
structure falsifies the formula. 0 
In a discussion of the robot action of “putting a block on another block”, Moore [ 411 
recognizes that knowing what blocks are involved may not be enough and suggests 
that the action be defined in terms of lower-level actions involving arm motions to the 
objects’ positions, grasping, and ungrasping. Now, knowledge of an object’s absolute 
position is not sufficient for being able to act upon it (and nor is it necessary). One 
may not know what one’s absolute position and orientation is and therefore may not 
be able to deduce where the object is relative to oneself. Our formalization reflects this 
fact. For instance, one can prove the following proposition with respect to the simple 
situation discussed earlier. It says that even if the agent is currently at some position 
p and knows that the absolute position of some object is p and that he is not holding 
anything, he still might not be able to achieve the goal of holding some object by 
doing the action PICKUP. The reason for this is simply that he may not know that he is 
at p. 
Proposition 4.6. 
~33p(here=pAKnow(3x(O~~~~~(x) APOS(X) =p) ~\+HoLDING(Y))) 
3 Can(PICKUP, 3x HOLDING(X) ) 
The proof is similar to that of the previous proposition; it appears in [ 291. 
On the other hand, we can also prove that if the agent knows that some object is 
where he currently is and that he is not holding anything, then he must be able to 
achieve the goal of holding some object by doing PICKUP: 
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Proposition 4.7. 
b K~ow( 3x( OBJECT( X) A POS( X) = here) A 73~ HOLDING(Y) ) 
1 CaII( PICKUP, 3x HOLDING(X) ) . 
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent holds at e and g. By Assumption 4.3, we have that 
e,g + 3dKnow(d = PICKUP), i.e., the agent knows what the action is. By quantifier 
reasoning, Assumption 4.1 implies that 
k %(OBJECT(X) A POS(X) = here) A 13~ HOLDING(Y) 
1 PhyPoss (PICKUP) A 3x AfterNec( PmwP, HOLDING(X) ) . 
So by Propositions 3.3 and 3.2 and the supposition, it must be the case that e, g b 
Know(PhyPoss(PICKUP) ), i.e., the agent knows that the action is physically possible, 
as well as that e, g b Know( 3xAfterNec(PICKUP, HOLDING(X))). It is straightfor- 
ward to produce a semantic proof that k 3vAfterNec( ed, 9) > AfterNec( Bd, 3vsp) 
(provided that v does not occur in ed). Thus by propositions 3.3 and 3.2, it must 
be the case that e, g k Know(AfterNec(PICKUP, &HOLDING(X) ) ), i.e., the agent 
knows after doing the action, the goal must hold. Thus by the definition, e,g + 
Can( PICKUP, &HOLDING(X) ) . 0 
The agent can be totally ignorant of what his (and the object’s) absolute position is 
and still be able to achieve the goal. 
Note that proposition 4.7 makes no requirement that the object that the agent ends 
up holding be the same as the one that was at his position before the action. This 
may appear too weak and an easy fix would involve assuming that the agent knows 
which object is involved. But it is possible to strengthen the above proposition without 
requiring such de re knowledge. For example, the following proposition captures the fact 
that the agent knows that after the action, he would be holding some object that was 
where he was before doing the action. Specifically, it says that if the agent knows that 
some object is currently at his position and that he is not currently holding anything, 
then he can by doing action PICKUP achieve the goal of holding some object that was 
at his own position before the PICKUP he has just done. 
Proposition 4.8. 
k KIIOW(~X(~BJECT(X) A POS(X) = here) A -3y HOLDING(~)) 
2 C~~(PICKUP,~X(HOLDING(X) A 
DoneWhen( PICKUP,OBJECT(X) A POS(X) = here))). 
The proof is similar to that of proposition 4.7; it appears in [29]. This result can be 
strengthened further to require uniqueness. But it should be clear that identifying the 
objects involved in the initial and goal situations, without requiring that it be known 
what objects they are, is not a trivial matter. 
Before moving on, let’s examine another variant of this situation. By the necessitation 
rule for By and universal generalization, an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.7 
is that any agent who knows that there is an object where he himself is and that he is 
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not holding anything must be able to achieve the goal of holding something by doing 
PICKUP, that is, k VuBy(a, qp), where spp is the formula of proposition 4.7. However, 
if instead of this, an agent a merely knows that there is an object where a is, it no 
longer follows that he is able to achieve the goal. 
Proposition 4.9. 
~~aBy(a,Know(3x(O~~~~~(x) APOS(X) =POS(U)) ~\~~~HoLDING(Y)) 
1 Can(PICKUP, 3x HOLDING(X))). 
The reason why this is not valid is simply that a may not know that he is a. This shows 
that knowing of oneself (de re) that if one does the action, the goal will necessarily 
hold afterwards, as Moore’s formalization of ability requires, is not sufficient for ability. 
One can similarly show that such de re knowledge is not necessary either (in some 
models of Proposition 4.7, the agent does not have such knowledge). 
4.3. Going to a relative position 
Let us now look at navigation. Since there are no obstacles in our robot’s world, it 
seems that given any relative position, the robot should be able to go there. Let us show 
formally that this is the case. The effects of action FORWARD are specified as follows: 
Assumption 4.10 (Effects of FORWARD). 
b ‘dp Vo( here = p A selfori = o 
3 Res(FORWARD,here =p + (1,0) x ROT(O))). 
Definition 4.11. selfori %’ ON ( self). 
Definition 4.12. 
ROT ( eb ) “zf 
cos e; sin 0: 
_ sine:, coseb ’ > 
Assumption 4.13. + V&O < ORI < 25-J. 
Assumption 4.14. b VX(HOLDING(X) 1 POS(X) = here). 
Assumption 4.10 says that as a result of doing FORWARD, the agent moves one 
square further along the direction he is facing; selfori represents the orientation of 
the agent with respect to the absolute frame of reference and ROT( t9:) is the rotation 
matrix associated with angle 0;. Assumption 4.14 says that objects held by the agent 
are where he is. We also need the following frame assumptions: that the agent’s doing 
FORWARD, must leave his orientation unchanged (a formal version of this appears in 
Appendix A.l), that it must leave the position of objects that are not held by him 
unchanged; and that it has no effect on whether or not an object is being held. 
L Lesphance, H.J. Levesque/Artijcial Intelligence 73 (1995) 69-115 93 
Notice that we use expressions from the language of arithmetic and analytic geometry 
in formalizing this domain. We make the following assumptions regarding these forms: 
Assumption 4.15. All the constants and function symbols from arithmetic and analytic 
geometry used are rigid (i.e., have the same denotation at every index). 
Assumption 4.16. All facts from arithmetic and analytic geometry are valid. I4 
A consequence of Assumption 4.15 is that the restrictions on specialization do not 
apply for arithmetic or analytic geometry expressions: 
Proposition 4.17. + Vusp 3 p{ v H 19}, provided that 8 is free for v in q and all 
constants and function symbols 0 contains are arithmetic or from analytic geometry. 
Finally, let us add a few more definitions: 
Definition 4.18. RPOSTOAPOS( 6;) !Ef (here + e; x ROT( Sdf0I-i) ) . 
Definition 4.19. RORITOAORI( 0;) %f MODz,( Sdfori + 6;). 
Definition 4.20. 
MovEDToBY($,, @,, S) 
Ef 3ub3vL (DuneWhen( 6, va = RROSTOAPOS( 8;) A U: = ROR~I’OAORQ 6:) ) 
Ahere=vpAselfori=vb), 
where t..$ and d, do not occur in t9$ @,, or S. 
RROSTOAPOS is a function that converts a relative position into an absolute 
one; similarly, ROR~TOAORI converts a relative orientation to an absolute one. 
MOVEDTOBY ($, @,, S) means that the agent has just done action 6 and that by doing 
so, he has moved to the square that was at relative position 0; (before the action) and 
has turned towards the direction that was relative orientation 0: (before the action). 
Now, let us discuss what these assumptions imply with respect o the ability of the 
robot to get to a given relative position. We start with a simple case: that the robot is 
able to go to the square directly in front of him (i.e., to relative position (1,O)) by 
doing FORWARD. In fact, the following proposition says something slightly stronger: 
that by doing FORWARD, one is able to achieve the goal of being on the square that 
was at relative position (1,O) before the action and of having one’s orientation remain 
unchanged. 
I4 This is essentially a placeholder for an axiomatization of arithmetic and analytic geometry; there should 
be no problem coming up with one that gives us all the facts we need even though it would necessarily be 
incomplete. 
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Proposition 4.21. t= Can( FORWARD, MOVEDTOBY ( ( 1 , 0) , 0, FORWARD) ). 
A proof of this proposition is in Appendix A. 1. 
This result can then be extended to deal with squares arbitrarily far away along the 
row that the agent is facing (i.e., relative positions (n, 0), where n E N). We can show 
that by doing FORWARD II times in sequence, one is able to achieve the goal of being 
on the square that was at relative position (n,O) before the action and of having one’s 
orientation remain unchanged: 
Proposition 4.22. For all n E IV, 
+ Can( FORWARD”, MOVEDTOBY ( (n, 0)) 0, FORWARD”) ) . 
The proof is in Appendix A.2. 
Now, let us look at the general case. The action of going to a relative position is 
defined below. The definition goes as follows: to go to relative position (n,O), where 
II E N, one simply goes forward n times; to go to relative position (m,O), where m is a 
negative integer, that is, to a position behind oneself, one turns left twice (i.e., IgO”), 
then goes to relative position (-m,O), and then one turns left twice again, so as to 
return to one’s original orientation; finally, to go to an arbitrary relative position (n, m), 
one first goes to (n,O), that is, to the right position on the x axis, then one turns left 
90”, then one goes to (m, 0), and then finally, one turns left three times (i.e., 270”) to 
return to the original orientation. 
Definition 4.23. 
GORPOS ( (n, 0) ) d:f FORWARD”, 
where II E N; 
GGRPGS((m,O)) ~fLE~2;GGRPGS((-m,0));LEFT”, 
where m E Z, m < 0; 
GORPOS((n,m)) dzf GORPOS((n,O));LE~;GORPOS((m,O));LEF+, 
where n,m E Z, m # 0. 
We also need provide a specification for the action of turning left. Its effects are 
formalized as follows: 
Assumption 4.24 (Effects of LEFT). 
This says that as a result of doing LEFT, the agent’s orientation is rotated by 90”. 
We also make the frame assumptions that doing LEFT does not affect the position of 
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anything nor whether any object is being held. Given this, it is straightforward toprove 
ability results for LEFT similar to the ones previously obtained for FORWARD. Let us 
only state our main result: 
Proposition 4.25. For all n E N, 
i= C~II(LE~,MOVEDTOBY((O,O), MOD~?,($~?~),LEFT”)). 
This says that by doing LEFT n times in sequence, the agent is able to achieve the 
goal of having his orientation rotated by n times 90” to the left of what it was before 
the action and of having his position remain unchanged. 
Then more generally, one can prove the following proposition about GORPOS; it says 
that one can, by doing GORPOS( (n, m)), achieve the goal of being on the square that 
was at relative position (n, m) before the action and of having one’s orientation remain 
unchanged: 
Proposition 4.26. For all n, m E Z, 
~C~~(GORPOS((~,~)),MOVEDTOBY((~,~),O,GORPOS((~,~)))). 
A proof of this proposition is in Appendix A.3. 
Let us also point out that our formalization captures the fact that an agent need not 
be able to go to a given absolute position, for example, in a situation where he does 
not know where he is. The following proposition formalizes a simple instance of this; it 
states that the agent need not be able to go to absolute position p by doing FORWARD, 
even if p happens to be the position of the square directly in front of him. 
Proposition 4.27. F Vp(p = RPOsTOAPOS( (1,0)) 3 Can(FORWARD, here = p)). 
A common reason for going somewhere is that one wants to get hold of or manipulate 
something that is there. It is straightforward to extend the results obtained so far and 
show that knowing the relative position of an object is sufficient for being able to go 
and manipulate it. Let RPOS(@) stand for the position of 8’ relative to self: 
Definition 4.28. RPOS( 6’) dzf ( (POS( 0’) - here) x ROT( -selfori) ) . 
In [29], we prove the following result: 
Proposition 4.29. For all n E N, 
i= I~ow( 3x( OBJECT( X) A EPOS( X) = (n, 0)) A -3~ HOLDING(Y) ) 
1 Can( (FORWARD”; PICKUP), 3x HOLDING(X) ) . 
This says that if the robot knows that there is an object at position (n,O) relative to 
himself, that is, on the n th square directly in front of him, and knows that he is not 
holding anything, then he is able to achieve the goal of holding some object by doing 
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FORWARD n times followed by PICKUP. Note that this result requires the additional 
frame assumption that whether an entity is an object is not affected by any action. We 
omit details as no new techniques are required. It should be easy to generalize this result 
and show that by doing GORPOS( (R m)) followed by PICKUP, the agent can come to 
hold something, provided that he knows that there is an object at relative position (n, m) 
and that he is not holding anything. 
4.4. Perception 
We will come back to this issue of what one must know in order to be able to go and 
manipulate an object, but now let’s have a look at perception. As observed earlier, it too 
yields indexical knowledge. I5 In our domain, the action SENSE constitutes a limited 
form of perception. We formalize the effects of SENSE as follows: 
Assumption 4.30. 
b b’~Ra( SENSE, Kwhether ( 3x( OBJECT( X) A POS ( X) = here A 
-HOLDING(X) AOFSHAPE(X,S)))). 
This assumption says that doing SENSE results in the agent knowing whether an 
unheld object of a given shape is present at his current position (we are assuming that 
there can only be a single object resting on a square and that the robot’s sensors are 
focussed on this object and not on any object that he might be holding). From this 
assumption and the fact that basic actions are assumed to be known, it follows trivially 
that by doing SENSE, the agent can find out whether there is an unheld object where he 
is and, if there is one, what its shape is. 
We also make the following frame assumptions: that the agent’s doing SENSE leaves 
his orientation and the positions of everything unchanged; that it does not change whether 
an object is held or not; and finally that no action affects the shape of objects. 
4.5. Ability to go where an object is 
Let’s now go back to the issue of what one must know in order to be able to go 
and act upon an object. We said that knowing the relative position of the object was 
sufficient for this. But in real life, agents rarely know exactly what the relative positions 
of objects are. More typically, they know roughly where objects are and scan the general 
area until they find the object. The following proposition formalizes an instance of this; 
it says that by sensing and then scanning forward, up to k squares, until he senses that 
an unheld object is present, the robot can achieve the goal of either knowing that there 
is an unheld object where he is, or knowing that there are no unheld objects on the 
k squares behind him (including the one he is currently on). The SCAN~( cp) action 
involves repetitively moving forward and sensing (up to k times) until (p becomes true. 
I5 Davis [lo-121 has done interesting work on the topic of reasoning about knowledge and perception; 
however, he does not address the fact that the knowledge obtained from perception is indexical knowledge. 
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Definition 4.31. SCANk ( p) !Zf whilek ( T(P, FORWARD; SENSE). 
Proposition 4.32. For all k E N, 
k Can((SENSE;SCAN&(3x(OBJUJT(x) A POS(x) = here A -HOLDING(X)))), 
KIIOW(~X(~BJECJ(X) A POS(X) = here A -HOLDING(X))) v 
Know(Gln(-k < n < Or\ ~X(OBJECT(X) A RPOS(X) = (n,O) A ~HoLDING(x))))). 
Appendix A.4 contains a proof of this proposition. 
So it is quite clear that ability to act upon an object does not require knowing its 
relative position. But then what is required? It seems that the best we can say is that 
the agent must know of some procedure that will take him to where the object is. 
This creates problems in formalizing the knowledge prerequisites of certain high-level 
parametrized actions, for example, the action of “going to the position of an object 6” 
GOWHERE( It would be inappropriate to treat this action as a primitive because we 
want to model how knowledge nables action at a more detailed level. The other way 
of dealing with such an action within our (and Moore’s) framework involves defining 
it in terms of lower-level actions that are parametrized with the information that must 
actually be known in order to be able to do the high-level action. This allows knowledge 
prerequisites to be enforced by the requirement that one know which primitive action 
to do next. But for actions like GOWHERE( it is not clear how this can be put into 
practice. 
However, notice that GOWHERE is a strange kind of action, in that it appears 
to refer to anything that would achieve the goal that the agent be where B is; it 
behaves as much as a goal as like an action. Perhaps we should rule out the intro- 
duction of such actions, but instead provide an action-less version of the Can operator: 
CanAch(q) would mean that self is somehow able to achieve 9. Then, we may use 
CanAch(pos( 8) = here A rp) instead of something like Can( c+oWHERE( 0) ,5p). I6 A 
coarse “syntactic” way of formalizing CanAch goes as follows: e, g + CanA&( (p) iff 
there exists an action expression S such that e, g b Can(G,4p). A more general and 
robust approach is proposed in [ 341. 
4.6. Map navigation 
A general account of ability must be based on a formalism that handles both indexical 
knowledge and objective knowledge, as well as knowledge that relates the agent’s 
perspective to the objective frame of reference, what we might call orienting knowledge. 
To see why this is the case, let us look at one last area of robotics, that of navigation 
with the help of a map. Maps (of the usual kind) contain objective information. To use 
this information, say to figure out how to get to a destination, an agent must first orient 
himself-find out where he is on the map, that is, what his absolute position is, and 
find out what his absolute orientation is. If he does not already have this information, 
I6 This assumes that it is known that B refers to the same entity before and after the action; the assumption 
can be dispensed with by referring to the denotation of 8 prior to the action as illustrated in Section 4.2. 
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he might try to obtain it by searching his environment for landmarks represented on the 
map. 
Our simple domain provides instances of this if we treat objects of various shapes as 
landmarks. Consider a variant of the scanning example of the previous section, where 
the robot knows what the absolute position of the unique object of shape s is (from 
having examined the map) ; then by scanning forward, the robot should be able to get 
into a state where he either knows where he is, or knows that the object is not in the 
region scanned. The following proposition shows that this is essentially correct. It says 
that if the robot knows that the unique object with shape s is at absolute position p and 
that it is not held, then by sensing and then scanning forward, up to k squares, until he 
senses that an unheld object with shape s is present, he can achieve the goal of either 
knowing that he is at absolute position p (i.e., knowing where he is), or knowing that 
the unheld object of shape s is on none of the k squares behind him (including the one 
he is currently on). 
Proposition 4.33. For all k E N, 
k VpVs( K~ow(~~(~BJEcT(~)~\Pos(~)= pA -HOLDING( 
VJJ(OFSHAPE(V,S) -y=x)))> 
Can( (SENSE;SCAN~(~X(OBJECT(X)APOS(X)=~~~~A~HOLDING(~)AOFSHAPE(.~,~)))), 
Know( here = p) V 
Know(ySn(-k < II < OA ~~(OBJECT(X) A RPOS(X)= (n,O)A ~HOLDING(X) 
A OFSHAPE(X,S)))))). 
The proof is omitted as it is similar to that of Proposition 4.32; a compete proof of a 
closely related result appears in [ 291. 
Similarly, an agent might find out what its absolute orientation is by searching for 
a pair of landmarks whose orientation relative to one another is indicated on the map, 
or perhaps by searching for a single landmark whose faces have distinctive shapes that 
are represented on the map. Once the agent has found out where he is and what his 
orientation is, he will know which relative position corresponds to any absolute position; 
he can then use the information in the map to figure out how to go where he wants. I7 
Orienting knowledge, that is, knowledge about how indexical notions are related to 
objective notions, allows objective knowledge to be mapped into indexical knowledge 
and vice versa. It is a key feature of our formalism that it allows all these kinds of 
knowledge to be represented. 
5. Other applications 
The notion of indexical knowledge and the important role it plays in action are most 
easily understood by looking at robotics examples as we did in the previous section. 
These involve actions taking place in physical space; the agent has knowledge that is 
relative to his point of view in physical space. This might suggest that the notion is 
bound to that of physical space. But this is not the case; the notion is really rather 
I7 Many of these characteristics of the map navigation problem were pointed out by Israel I22 I. 
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abstract. It is useful as long as the domain involves agents that operate in some kind of 
space, from some kind of point of view into that space. 
In [29], two non-robotics domains that involve very abstract notions of space are 
examined. The first involves an agent making a phone call. The phone system is naturally 
viewed as a kind of space structured into various kinds of regions and sub-regions, An 
agent can be quite ignorant of what characterizes his absolute position in that space, 
things like area code, country code, etc. This domain was formalized and it was proven 
that an agent is able to establish a connection to some phone if he knows what its 
number is and either knows that it is in his own area, or knows that it is not and knows 
what the phone’s area code is (international and same-area long distance calls were 
ignored). 
The other domain examined is that of data structure search and manipulation. At first, 
it might seem strange to look at this in terms of an agent located in some kind of 
space and having knowledge that is relative to his point of view into that space, yet 
this seems very much the outlook taken by many algorithms; one talks about following 
pointers and searching graphs. An example involving the heapsort algorithm [4] was 
partly formalized. We sketched a proof of the fact that an agent is able to heapify a tree 
consisting of a new node installed as root of two existing heaps by sifting the new node 
down the tree until its key is at least as large as that if its sons. l8 Note that the “space” 
involved in this example has a very different topology from that of physical space. 
There is as much of a need for keeping track of one’s place in time as of one’s 
place in space. In the spatial examples of Section 4, we described cases where the 
agent is required to know his absolute position, other cases where he need only know 
where something is relative to himself, that is, know its relative position, and still 
other cases where neither kind of knowledge is needed-the agent needs only know a 
navigation procedure that gets him where he wants. The same kind of distinctions apply 
to situations where temporal knowledge is required for ability. Depending on the case, 
the agent might need to: 
( 1) know what time it is, e.g., an agent that needs to lock up a room at a specific 
time, say 5 p.m., and does so by checking a clock until the time comes, 
(2) know how much time some process needs to go on, e.g., an agent who soft-boils 
an egg (i.e., cooks it without having the yolk solidify) using a timer, 
(3) monitor the environment for a condition indicating that a process has gone on 
long enough, e.g., an agent who wants to fry a fish filet without overcooking it 
and who achieves this by frying it until its flesh is no longer translucent. 
In [29], a formalization of the first two examples is sketched. The third example does 
not require time to be explicitly represented; it can be formalized much like the scanning 
example of Section 4.5. In [ 321, we also formalize an example of a common temporal 
reasoning/planning problem that can only be handled in a formalism that includes both 
indexical and non-indexical concepts and supports reasoning using both. The example 
involves an agent hat does not initially know what time it is; he must keep track of time 
in relative terms (using a timer), but later convert his indexical knowledge into absolute 
I8 A heap is a binary tree that satisfies the “heap property”, that is, where the key stored at any node is greater 
or equal to the ones stored at its left and right sons (if they exist). 
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knowledge (by finding out what time it is) for communication to another agent. I9 It 
was found that the framework proposed provides the necessary tools for producing a 
satisfactory formalization in every one of these cases. 
6. The need for distinguishing between indexical and objective knowledge 
To someone accustomed to the objective point of view of science or mathematics, 
indexicality (context-sensitivity) may appear as little more than an artifact of natural 
language. One may thus claim that while using indexical descriptions is often convenient, 
in practice, indexical knowledge can always be understood objectively. One reason for 
wishing that this claim were true has to do with the fact that the semantic content of 
indexical representations depends on the context, so if the context changes you may 
have to adjust the representations to keep the semantic content unchanged. For instance, 
if an agent’s knowledge base describes some facts as holding “now”, then at the next 
time step, it should describe these facts as holding “one time step before now”. *’ Haas 
[ 171 points out that the cost of adjusting a knowledge base that contains indexical time 
references for the passage of time would be high, if implemented in the obvious way. 
He proposes that a robot use its internal clock to eliminate all occurrences of “now” in 
its representations. 
Let us discuss the claim that indexical knowledge can be reduced to objective knowl- 
edge. In our semantics for knowledge, indexical terms and formulas are treated as 
relative to an agent and a time; for example, knowing that something is here amounts 
to knowing that something is at one’s position at the current time. Given this, it is clear 
that if one knows who one is and knows what time it is (remember that we are taking 
de re knowledge to require knowing a standard name), then anything that one knows in 
an indexical way is also known in an objective way. *’ But is it reasonable to assume 
that an agent always knows who he is and what time it is? 
Let’s consider the temporal part of this question (see [ 321 for a more detailed 
discussion). First, humans do not have internal clocks that they can use in the way a 
robot can, and they do not always know what time it is. A system that is interacting 
with humans will need to model this (e.g. to remind a user that his meeting is just 
starting). Even if we limit ourselves to simple robotics contexts, it seems unlikely that 
the internal clocks of robots could be guaranteed to be accurate. In such cases, Haas’s 
I9 Specifically, the agent has to set a turkey to roast in the oven and leave a message saying when the turkey 
started roasting, so that someone else can take it out when it is ready. But the agent (who sets the turkey 
to roast) does not initially know what time it is and only has access to the one-hour timer on the stove and 
a radio station that announces the time at least every 30 minutes. The plan we consider involves putting the 
turkey in the oven, setting the timer to one hour, then listening to the radio until the time is announced while 
keeping track of the roasting time with the timer, and finally calculating the time the turkey started roasting, 
and leaving a message to that effect. 
2o Subramanian and Woodfill [ 521 prove that such a transformation is truth-preserving within their indexical 
situation calculus framework. 
*t E.g., if at 10 a.m. Dec. 8, 1991, Rob the robot knows that there is currently a pop can one meter in front 
of him, and also knows who he is and what time it is, then he must know of Rob and of 10 a.m. Dec. 8, 
1991 that there is a pop can one meter in front of that person at that time (de re). 
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scheme leads to indexical information being misrepresented. Moreover, Haas’s robot 
cannot even represent the fact that his internal clock is incorrect; it could not monitor 
for this and plan to get its clock reset when appropriate. Also, for very simple (e.g. 
insect-like) robots, the cost of fitting them with internal clocks and setting them may 
be too high. Finally, as Haas recognizes, it is not at all clear that the cost of updating 
a temporal knowledge base that contains indexicals need be prohibitive; for example, 
if all occurrences of “now” are replaced by a new constant and the fact that this new 
constant is equal to “now” is added, then only this single assertion eed be updated as 
time passes. 
Work on reactive agent architectures supplies other reasons for wanting a formalism 
that can represent indexical knowledge. As pointed out by Agre and Chapman [21, the 
world can change in unexpected ways and reasoning about change can be very costly; 
in some cases it is better to rely on perception to get fresh information at every time 
step rather than try to update a representation of the world; in such cases, the problem 
of updating indexical representations does not arise. And as Rosenschein and Kaelbling 
[48] have shown, it is legitimate to ascribe knowledge to agents even when they have 
no explicit representation of this knowledge. In such cases, one needs a formalism that 
distinguishes between indexical and objective knowledge just to accurately model the 
agent’s thinking. The output of the agent’s perception module says nothing about time, 
and even if the agent has a correct internal clock, he may have no need to time-stamp 
his knowledge, We want a formalism that makes the distinctions required to model this. 
Let us briefly discuss the other half of the above question, that is, whether agents 
need always know who they are (know a standard name for themselves). It is tempting 
to dismiss the usual amnesia examples as mere philosophical curiosities. But if we think 
of very simple agents, say insects; it would not seem all that unusual to have them 
not know who they are; in fact, one is hard pressed to come up with good reasons for 
them to need to know who they are. One can also imagine mass produced computers 
or robots that do not have their name etched in memory at the factory or even entered 
at boot-time. One might also look at processes running in a computer as agents. Grove 
[ 141 and Grove and Halpem [ 151 describe cases in the area of distributed systems and 
communication protocols where one does not want to assume that agents know who they 
are. One of their examples involves a set of processes that are running a leader-election 
protocol (to select one of them to play some special role later on) ; the processes are 
anonymous, they do not have any unique identifier as part of their state and they are all 
running the same program; they do not know who they are. 
7. Conclusion 
Agents act upon and perceive the world from a particular perspective. It is important to 
recognize this relativity to perspective if one is not to be overly demanding in specifying 
what they need to know in order to be able to achieve goals through action. In many 
cases (especially simple interactions with their physical environment) they need not 
know much about their objective situation; what they need is indexid knowledge, 
knowledge about how they are related to things in their environment or to events in 
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their history. And perception yields just the kind of indexical knowledge that is needed. 
Previous formal accounts of the ability of agents to achieve goals by doing actions, 
such as that of Moore [ 40,411 and Morgenstern [ 42,431, have ignored this, and thus 
end up imposing knowledge requirements that are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
ability; they fail to properly specify the knowledge prerequisites and effects of actions. 
In this work, we have developed a formal solution to the problem of how one should 
model the indexical knowledge prerequisites and effects of action. We have also shown 
how the theory can be used to formalize several common types of interaction between 
a robot and its environment. 
7.1. Contributions 
Let us review the ways in which our theory improves over previous accounts of 
the relationship between knowledge and action. Our account of knowledge formally 
captures the distinction between indexical and objective knowledge: it allows an agent 
to know something in an indexical way without knowing it in any kind of objective 
way and vice-versa. Knowledge about how objective notions are related to indexical 
notions can be expressed, thus allowing objective knowledge to be mapped into indexical 
knowledge and vice-versa. Also, the account fully handles time, in particular, temporally 
indexical knowledge. Its simple modal syntax provides succinct ways of expressing most 
matters of interest, in particular, attributions of indexical knowledge. Its model-theoretic 
semantics is a simple and natural extension of standard possible-world semantic schemes 
for the logic of knowledge. It retains what is perhaps the most attractive feature of 
possible-world semantics: the correspondence between constraints on the accessibility 
relation and important properties of the notion formalized. On the other hand, it also 
inherits some limitations of the possible-world approach, in particular, the “logical 
omniscience” problem (i.e., agents are taken to know all the logical consequences of 
their knowledge, as well as all validities). Finally, our account includes a formalization 
of the requirement that knowledge be persistent that works well with both temporally 
indexical and temporally absolute knowledge. 
The temporal subset of our logic is simple and very expressive. Both objective and 
indexical temporal assertions can be made. Relations between indexically specified 
and objectively specified times can also be expressed. The fact that terms denoting 
times are included allows quantification over times into epistemic contexts, so one 
can make very weak ascriptions of temporal knowledge; for example, one can ex- 
press the claim that John knows that Paul knows what time it is without John himself 
knowing it with the formula KIIOW( JOHN, 3tKnow(PAur_, now = t) ) The occurrence 
of concurrent actions, continuous processes, and actions involving several agents can 
be expressed (even though our account of ability does not deal with these cases). 
There is one significant limitation: one cannot express the occurrence of actions in- 
volving indefinite iteration (unbounded while-loops). More generally, our account of 
the logic is limited by the fact that we have not identified a full axiomatization (even 
though the set of properties identified in [29,33] is an important step in that di- 
rection) ; in fact, we do not know whether the set of valid formulas is recursively 
enumerable. 
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Our formalization of ability improves over previous accounts in several ways. Firstly, 
it does not require an agent to know who he is in order to be able to achieve a 
goal by doing an action; all references to the agent within the knowledge required are 
indexical references. For instance, in the simple action case we require the agent to 
know that it is physically possible for himself to do the action and that if he himself 
does the action, the goal will necessarily hold afterwards (as well as knowing what 
the action is). De re knowledge of oneself is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
agent to be able to achieve the goal (a concrete example was given in Section 4.2). 
Situations where an agent does not know who he is (in the sense of not knowing 
an objective standard name for himself) are perhaps unusual, but our theory could 
not claim to reflect a real understanding of indexicality if it did not deal with such 
cases. 
Secondly, our account of ability is based on a very expressive temporal logic. We can 
thus handle prerequisites or effects of actions that involve knowledge of absolute times 
and knowing what time it is, as well as many cases of actions that refer to times (e.g., 
the action of “locking up at 5 p.m.“, discussed in Section 5). This would also make it 
easier to extend the account o handle more complex actions than are currently treated, 
for instance concurrent actions, actions involving several agents, and actions that refer 
to time in very general ways. 
Finally, the logic on which the account of ability is based includes an adequate 
treatment of indexical knowledge in general; as the applications in Sections 4 and 5 
show, this allows a more accurate specification of the knowledge prerequisites and 
effects of actions. 
On the other hand, our account of ability suffers from various limitations. The class of 
actions handled is quite restricted. Moreover, the notion modeled is extremely idealized: 
it requires that the action absolutely guarantee that the goal will be achieved-a high 
probability of success is not enough. 
We have shown how the framework can be used to model various common types of 
interaction between a robot and its environment. These examples how how actions 
can be formalized so as to avoid making excessive requirements upon the knowl- 
edge of agents-so that only indexical knowledge, as opposed to objective knowl- 
edge, is required when that is sufficient. Our formalization accounts for the facts 
that perception yields indexical knowledge, and that ability to act upon an object 
does not require knowing which object is involved or what its absolute position is. 
It was also shown how indexical knowledge and objective knowledge can be related 
in the framework, to deal with the use of maps for navigation. Many representa- 
tional issues that have general relevance to the formalization of actions with indexi- 
cal knowledge prerequisites or effects were discussed. Applications of the theory in 
other domains, in particular, ones that involve temporal knowledge, were also briefly 
discussed. These applications provide evidence to that effect that the distinction be- 
tween indexical and objective knowledge supported by our framework has substan- 
tial practical value and that it cannot be done justice within existing accounts of 
ability. 
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7.2. Directions for future research 
A major difficulty in producing a usable framework for reasoning about action is 
the frame problem, that is, providing a way of specifying actions that does not require 
enumerating all properties that are not affected by them. Recently, Reiter [47] has 
proposed a solution to the frame problem within the situation calculus and Scherl and 
Levesque [49] have extended this solution to deal with knowledge and knowledge- 
producing actions. The approach allows a form of regression to be used to reduce 
reasoning about what facts hold in a situation to reasoning about what facts held in an 
initial situation. We are currently reformulating our framework into an extended version 
of the situation calculus so as to incorporate this approach to the frame problem [ 501. 
As mentioned earlier, our formalization of ability has many limitations. It should be 
extended to handle more complex types of actions, such as those involving indefinite 
iteration, nondeterminism, and concurrency, as well as plans involving multiple agents. 
Morgenstern [42,43] as well as our recent work [ 341 handle some of these cases, 
but these accounts do not deal with indexicality. Situations involving interacting agents 
are especially interesting from the indexicality point of view, since the difference in 
perspective between agents must be accounted for if they are to have indexical knowledge 
of the same facts. For example, imagine that we are cooperating in the dismantling of a 
motor, and are facing each other; suppose we need to jointly use a certain wrench in the 
next step; I might have to come to know that the wrench we are to use is the one on my 
left while you need to realize that it is the one on your right. However, multiple agents 
settings give rise to new difficulties for reasoning about change. One issue is whether 
agents know about all event occurrences that could affect their situation and if not, what 
assumptions they make about such events. Morgenstem [44] has proposed an approach 
to deal with this. Another issue connected to indexicality is the question of how agents 
refer to each other. In many cases, agents know of each other only under some indexical 
description (e.g., “the person in front of me now”) ; it would be inappropriate to assume 
that agents always know who all the agents involved are. The formalization proposed in 
[30] deals with this. 
It would also be desirable to untangle various aspects of the notion of ability- 
distinguish between “being able to achieve a goal” and “knowing how to execute an 
action”, between cases where the agent is aware of his ability and cases where he is 
not, between cases where the agent acts as a dumb interpreter of a program and cases 
where he does some optimization, etc. We are currently working on a formalization that 
deals with these distinctions, handles indefinite iteration and non-determinism, and is 
compatible with the approach to the frame problem mentioned earlier [34]. As well, 
the formalization of Section 3.6 requires that it be known that performing the action 
absolutely guarantees that the goal will be achieved. Yet, in most real situations, agents 
cannot hope to attain such a degree of certainty. It would be desirable to come up with 
an account that can cope with this. Both default and probabilistic approaches should 
looked at. 
It would also be desirable to have a mathematically satisfactory axiomatization of the 
logic-one that is complete, if this is achievable. This might require a re-examination 
of some aspects of the logic. 
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Another issue that should be investigated is the interaction between indexicality and 
hierarchical plans. It seems that the top level actions in such a plan would usually be 
specified in a relatively objective way (e.g., go to City Hall), while the lower level 
actions would be indexically specified (e.g., turn right at the next light). How do the 
different levels in such a plan relate to each other? Route planning should be a good 
test domain. 
Indexicality is but one aspect of situatedness. One should look at how other aspects 
can be modeled. For instance, Barwise [ 51 talks about how “situated inference” is often 
relative to background conditions; as an example, he describes how one might infer that 
an object will fall from the fact that it has been released in mid-air, an inference that 
is relative to the presence of gravity. In many cases, such background conditions play a 
role in ensuring that an agent’s doing some action will achieve his goal, but the agent is 
totally unaware of it, or he simply ignores it because these conditions normally hold in 
his usual environment. It should be possible to extend our account o model this notion 
of “ability relative to background conditions”. More challenging would be developing a 
propositional attitude model of the kind of opportunistic acting/planning that Agre and 
Chapman describe in [ 31, but not obviously beyond current echniques. 
The theory holds great potential for applications in the modeling of communication 
(both natural-language and that involving artificial agents exchanging messages in de- 
signed languages), especially in conjunction with the extensions mentioned earlier. We 
have seen that the knowledge required for many types of action is indexical. Thus while 
many uses of indexical expressions in language are only communicative shortcuts, ways 
of succinctly referring to the relevant entities, it should not be surprising that there are 
also cases where the information that needs to be communicated is intrinsically index- 
ical. For example, I can help you get to my place by telling you where it is relative 
to your currenf position. To model this, one needs a formal account of communication 
that relates the context sensitivity of language to that of mental states and action.** 
In [ 301, a preliminary version of such an account is developed, using our theory of 
indexical knowledge and action as a foundation. Some recent work [54] has focussed 
on providing agents that interact with the world with the ability to understand natural 
language instructions; this would be an ideal setting for exploring concrete applications 
of such an account. 
Last but not least, the theory would appear to hold much promise for applications 
in the design of reactive agents. Rosenschein and Kaelbling [ 24,481 use a logical 
formalism as a design notation and as a specification language in their robot design 
framework. Since indexical knowledge appears to be centrally involved in the production 
of reactive behavior [ 2,521, it seems that elements of our logic could prove useful in 
these roles. It might even be useful as a representation language for a planner or 
22 No existing model of natural language use does this. Some, like Cohen and Levesque’s [9], include 
sophisticated accounts of how the knowledge and intentions of agents am involved in speech acts, but ignore 
indexicality, in both utterances and mental attitudes. Others, such as Barwise and Perry’s [ 61, include elaborate 
treatments of indexicality, but do not provide any kind of computational account of how an agent can draw 
inferences from his prior knowledge and the indexical representations that result from interpreting an utterance. 
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sophisticated executor. This kind of application might also yield back some insights into 
indexicality and suggest refinements to our theory. 
Appendix A. Additional proofs 
A.I. Proof of Proposition 4.21 
First, let us formally state one of the frame assumptions for FORWARD mentioned in 
Section 4.3: 
Assumption A.1 (FORWARD does not affect selfori) . 
+ v/0( SelfOri = 0 3 AfterNec( FORWARD, selfori = o) ) . 
We prove Proposition 4.21 by first showing a more general result, Lemma A.3 below. 
The following lemma is used in its proof. 
Lemma A.2. 
k b’pV~( MOVEDTOBY (p, o, 6) 3 
AfterNec( FORWARD, MOVEDTOBY (p + ( 1,O) x ROT(O) , 
0, (8; FORWARD) ) ) ) . 
Proof. 
( 1) Take arbitrary e = (w, a, t) and g. Assume that e, g b MOVEDTOBY(~, o, 6). 
(2) Take arbitrary w* and te such that w zt w* and t 5 t,. Let e* = (w*, a, t) and 
e: = (w*, a, te). Assume that A( [IFoRwARDT],,,~, e*, tel. 
(3) By Proposition 3.7, ( 1) implies that e*, g k MOVEDTOBY(~, o, 6). 
(4) By this and (2), it follows that there exists t, such that 
(w*,a,t,),g{t, ---) te} ~Does((&RORwARD),t,). 
Let e: = (~*,a, ts). We must now show that [selforiJ& = [ROR~TOAORI(O)~,:,~ and 
uhe~n,~ ,g = [RPOSTOAP~~(~ + (1,0) x ROT(O))I],~,~. 
(5) By Assumption A.1 and the reflexivity of q (constraint (4) in Section 3.4)) 
we must have that [IselforiJ&, = [selforin,,,,. By (3), we have that [selfori],, g = 
[RORITOAORI( o)],. ,s. SO it must be the case that [selfor& g = [RORtTOAORt(o)],_ 
(6) By Assumption 4. IO and the reflexivity of q, we have that 
uhe4ed,g = [heren,,,, + (I, 0) x ROT( [selfori],,,g). 
By (3), we have that [here],,,, = [IRPOSTOAPOS(p)],:,,, which implies that 
uhe4kr,g = [RPOSTOAPOS ( p ) 1,: ,g + ( ( 1 (0) x ROT( [[selforiJj,* ,g ) ) 
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By (5) we then get that 
[Ihe&: ,g = [RPOSTOAPOS(~)~,~,~ + ((1,O) X RoT([[RoRIToAoRI(o)n,:,p)). 
By the definitions of RPOSTOAPOS and RORITOAORI, this means that 
Uhemll,: .g = [[(hem + p x ROT(seifori)) 
+ (1,0) X ROT(MOD&?lfOri+ O))]_. 
Thus 
[heE],c,g= [here + (p + (1,O) x ROT(~)) x RoT(selfori)],~,g 
= [RPOSTOAPOS(~ + (i,o) X ROT(o))],z,B. 
(7) From (4), (5) and (6), it follows that 
e,*,g /== MOVEDTOBY(~ + (1,0) x ROT(O),O, (&FORWARD)). 
Since w* and & are arbitrary, this together with (2) implies that 
e , g + AfterNec ( FORWARD, 
MOVEDTOBY(P + (1,0) x ROT(o),o,(S;FORWARD))). Cl 
Lemma A.3. 
+ ‘@VO( KIIOW( MOVEDTOBY (p, o, 8) ) 
2 Can(FORWARD,MOVEDTOBY(p + (1,0) x ROT(O), 
0, (S;F~RWARD)))). 
Proof. Let 4p Ef MOVEDTOBY (p, o, 8) and 
P’%~MOVEDTOBY(P + (1,O) x ROT(O),O, (&FORWARD)). 
Take arbitrary e and g. Suppose that e, g i= Know(p). We must show that 
e, g b Can(FORWARD, 9’). By Assumption 4.3, we must have that e, g k 
3d Know(d = FORWARD). It is easy to show that Assumption 4.10 implies that 
b PhyPoss(FORwARD). Thus by Proposition 3.3, b ~ow(PhyPoss(FORWARD)). 
By Propositions 3.3 and 3.2, Lemma A.2 implies that k Know(p) > 
Know(AfterNec(FORWARD, cp’)). By the above supposition, this implies that e, g b 
Know ( After&c ( FORWARD, cp’ ) ) . 0 
Let us now proceed with the proof of Proposition 4.21 proper. It is easy to show 
that + MOVEDTOBY ( (0, 0), 0, noOp) . By Proposition 3.3, we must then also have that 
k KXIOW( MOVEDTOBY ( (0,O) , 0, noOp) ) . Thus, by Lemma A.3, we have that 
k Can( FORWARD, 
MOVJZDTOBY ( (0,O) + (1,O) x ROT( 0) , 0, (noOp; FORWARD) ) . 
Since + Does( (noOp; 8) , 0’) E Does( S, et), the desired result follows by Proposi- 
tion 4.17 and Assumption 4.16. 0 
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.22 
As for Proposition 4.21, we proceed by first showing a more general result: 
Lemma A.4 For all n E N, 
k V~VO(KIIOW(MOVEDTOBY(~,O,S)) 
1 Can( FORWARD”, MOVEDTOBY (p + (n, 0) x ROT( 0) , 
0, (&~oRw&)))). 
Proof. By induction over n. 
Base case: n = 0. In this case we only need to show that 
k V@‘O(~~OW(MOVEDTOBY(~,O,@) 
1 K~OW(MOVEDTOBY(~ + (0,O) x ~~~(o),o,(fi;noOp)))). 
It is easy to show that b Does( (8; noOp), 0’) s Does(S, 0’). This together with 
Proposition 4.17 and Assumption 4.16 implies that 
/= MOVEDTOBY(~ + (0,O) x ROT(O),O, (6;noOp)) E MovEDToBY(~,o,@. 
From this, the desired result follows easily by Propositions 3.3 and 3.2. 
Induction step: Assume that the formula is valid for n and show that it must then be 
valid for n + 1. By the induction hypothesis and Proposition 4.17, we have that 
k KIIOW( MOVEDTOBY (p + (1,O) x ROT( 0) , o, (8; FORWARD) ) ) 
1 Can(FoRwARD”,MOvEDTOBY(p + (1,0) x ROT(o) + (n,O) x ROT(o), 
o,((S;F~RWARD);F~RWARD”))). 
It is easy to show that /= Does((G1;&);&) E Does(&; (&;83)). By this, Proposi- 
tion 4.17, and Assumption 4.16, the above simplifies to 
k KIIOW(MOVEDTOBY(~ + (1,O) x ROT(O),O, (&FORWARD))) 
1 Can(FoRwARDn,MOvJSDTOBY(p + (n+ 1,0) x ROT(o), 
0 (&FORWARD”+‘))). 3 , 
By Propositions 3.8 and 3.9, it follows from this and Lemma A.3 that the formula is 
validforn+ 1. Cl 
Given this lemma, we can prove Proposition 4.22 in the same way that Propo- 
sition 4.21 was proved in the previous subsection (Lemma A.4 is used instead of 
Lemma A.3). 0 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4.26 
In this case too, we proceed by first showing a more general result, Lemma A.6 
below. The proof uses the following strengthened version of Proposition 4.25: 
Lemma A.5 For all n E N, 
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b Vp’dl~( KIIOW( MOVEDTOBY (p, o, S) > 
1 Can(LEFT”, MovEDToBY(~, MOD~&U i- n?r/2), (& LEPL”)))). 
We omit its proof, which goes along the same lines as that of Lemma A.4. 
Lemma A.6 For all n, m E Z, 
k V$V'O(KIIOW(MOVEDTOBY(~,~,~)) 
3 C~~(~~RPOS((~,~)),MO~EDTOBY(P + (n,m) x ROT(O), 
o,(s;GORPoS((n,m)))))). 
Pmf. Case 1. m = 0 and n E N: Then 
GORPOS ( (n, m) ) = FORWARD” 
and the desired result follows immediately from Lemma A.4. 
Case 2. m = 0 and n < 0: Then 
GoRPoS( (n, m)) = LEF?; GORPOS( -?Z,O)); LEF?. 
By Lemma A.5, proposition 4.17, and Assumption 4.16, we have that 
b KIIOW(MOVEDTOBY(~,~,S)) 
> Can(LE~,MOVEDTOBY(p,MOD2,(o + r), (&LEti>>>. 
By Case 1 and proposition 4.17, we have that 
i= ~ow(MOVEDTOBY(p,MOD2,,(o+ r), @;LEl+))) 
> Can(GORPos((-n,O)), 
MOVEDTOBYQ + (-n,O) x ROT(MOD~,(O + r)), 
MOD2r(O+7r),(S;LEFl-$GORPOS((--n,0))))). 
By propositions 3.8 and 3.9, one can chain these results to obtain: 
k KIIOW(MOVEDTOBY(~,~,~)) 
> Can( (LE~;GORPOS( (-n,O))), 
MOVEDTOBY(~ + (-n.0) x ROT(MOD2,(0+ ?r)), 
MOD2,(0+7r),(8;LEF+;GORPOS((-n,(l))))). 
By chaining this again with an appropriate instance of Lemma A.5, one obtains that 
k KIIOW(MOVEDTOBY(~,~,S)) 
> Can(GORPos( (n,O)), 
MOVEDTOBY(~ + (-n,O) x ROT(MOD2,(0 + r)), 
MODZ,~(MOD~,(O+~~) + ),(&GORPOS((n,O))))). 
Now it is easy to check that 
(-n,O) x ROT(MO&,(o+7i-))=(-ncos(o+7r),--nsin(o+~)) 
=(ncos(o),nsin(o)) 
= (n,O) x ROT(O). 
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It is also the case that 
RORITOAORI(MOD2,(MOD2,(0 + ?r) + 7~)) 
= MOD2, (SelfOh + MOD2, (MOD2, ( o + %-) + 71) ) 
= MoD2, (selfori + 0) 
= RORITOAORI (0). 
So by the definition of MOVEDTOBY and proposition 4.16, we must have that 
k MOVEDTOBY(JJ + (-n,O) x ROT(MOD~,(~ + n-)), 
MODzp(MOD2,(0 + rr) + V), 
(6; GORPW (F 0)) ) ) 
= MOVEDTOBY (p + (n. 0) x ROT(O) , o, (8; GORPOS( (n, 0)) ) ). 
The desired result follows. 
Case 3. m # 0: Then 
GORPOS ( (II, m) ) = GOBPOS ( (II, 0) ) ; LEFT; GOBPOS ( (m , 0) ) ; LEl+ . 
The proof is similar to Case 2. By chaining (Propositions 3.8 and 3.9) appropriate 
instances of Case 2 with instances of Lemma AS, we show that 
+ KIIOW( MOVEDTOBY (p, o, 6) ) 
> Can(GORPOS( (n,m)), 
MOVEDTOBY(~ + (n,O) x ROT(O) + (m,O) x ROT(MOD2,(o+ z-/2)), 
MODz,(MOD2,( 0 + 7r/2) + 3~/2), 
(s;GORPOs((n,m))))). 
One then shows that 
+ MOVEDTOBYQ + (n,O) x ROT(O) + (m,O) x ROT(MOD~,(~+ 7r/2)), 
MODZ,,(MODZ,(O+~~/~) +3~/2),(6;GORPOS((n,m)))) 
f MOVEDTOBY (p + ( n,m) X ROT(~),O,(&GORPOS((~,~)))) 
to obtain the desired result. 0 
Given this lemma, we can then prove Proposition 4.26 in the same way that Proposi- 
tion 4.21 was proved in Section A.1 (Lemma A.6 is used instead of Lemma A.3). 0 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4.32 
Let us first introduce some shorthands: 
l UOAT( 0:) dzf 3vi( OBJECT( vi) A RPOS( u’ ) = (et, 0) A ~HOLDING( vi) ), provided 
ui does not occur free in 0:; 
. UOH d:f UOAT( 0) ; 
l UOBTW( 0:, 0:) dzf 3u’( 0; 6 ui < 0: A UOAT( vi)), provided vi does not occur 
free in 0: and 81; 
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UOAT( 13:) says that there is an unheld object 6: squares directly in front of the agent 
(behind the agent if 0; is negative) ; UOH says that there is an unheld object here; and 
finally, UOBTW( @, 0;) says that there is an unheld object between 0; and 6: squares 
directly in front of or behind the agent. 
We prove Proposition 4.32 by first establishing a result concerning its scanning com- 
ponent, Lemma A.9 below. This result depends on two sublemmas. The first concerns 
the FORWARD action: 
Lemma A.7. For all n E N, 
+ Know( +OBTW( -n, 0) ) 
3 Can(FORwARD,+OBTW(-n- 1,-l)). 
This lemma can be proven from Assumptions 4.3 and 4.10, as well as the frame 
assumptions for FORWARD mentioned in Section 4.3; a detailed proof of a closely 
related result appears in [29]. The second preliminary lemma concerns the SENSE 
action: 
Lemma A.8 For all n E N, 
+Know(+JOBTW(-n,-1)) 
> Can( SENSE, Know( UOH) V Know( ~UOBTW( -n, 0) ) ) . 
It can be proven from Assumptions 4.3 and 4.30, and the frame assumptions for 
SENSE mentioned in Sections 4.4 and 4.3. 
Let us now proceed with the main lemma concerned with scanning: 
Lemma A.9. For all k, n E N, 
k Know(UOH) VKnow(~UOBTW(-n,O)) 
> Can( scmk( UOH) , Know( UOH) V Know( -UOBTW( -n - k, 0) ) ) . 
Proof. By induction over k. 
Base case: SCANO(UOH) dzf noOp and b Can(noOp, cp) 3 Know( 4p), so all we 
need to show is that for all n E IV, 
k Know(UOH) V Know(+IOBTW( -n,O)) 
> ti~w(Know(UOH) V Know(TUOBTW(-n,O))). 
This is easily done using Propositions 3.5, 3.3, and 3.2. 
Induction step: Assume that the formula is valid for k and show that it must then be 
valid for k + 1. 
SCANk+i (UOH) dzf if( +OH, FORWARD; SENSE; SCANT (UOH) , noOp) , 
and so by Proposition 3.10, we have that 
p Can(ScAN~++I(UOH),Know(UOH) VKnow(+JOBW(-n- (k+ l),O))) 
E (Know(UOH)ACan(noOp,Know(UOH)VKnow(~UOBTW(-n-(k+1),0)))) 
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V (Know( 7UOH) A Can( FORWARD; SENSE; SCAN~( UOH), 
Know(UOH) VKnow(-3JOBTW(-n - (k+ l),O)))). 
By Propositions 3.5, 3.3, and 3.2, it is easy to show that for all n E N, 
/= Know(UOH) 3 
Know(UOH) A Can(noOp, Know(UOH) V K~ow(TUOBTW(-n - (k + l),O))). 
What remains to be proved is that for all n E N, 
/= Know(-JJOBTW( --n, 0)) 
3 (Know( -dJOH) A Can( FORWARD; SENSE; SCANT (UOH), 
Know( UOH) V KIIOW( ~UOBTW( -n - (k + I), 0) ) ) ) 
Clearly k ~UOBTW( -n, 0) > 4JOH for n E N; so by Propositions 3.3 and 3.2, 
we have that for all n E N, f= Know( 7UOBTW( -n, 0)) > Know( 1UOH). From 
Lemma A.8 and the induction hypothesis, it follows by Proposition 3.8 that for all 
n E N, 
/=Know(TUOBTW(-(n+ 1),-l)) > 
Can( SENSE; SCANk (UOH) , 
Know(UOH) VKnow(7UOBTW(-(n + 1) - k,O))). 
By Propositions 3.8 and 3.9, this and Lemma A.7 imply that for all n E W, 
+ Know( TUOBTW( -n, 0) ) 
3 Can( FORWARD; SENSE; SCANk (UOH) , 
Know(UOH) V&ow(lUOBTW(-n- (kf l),O))). 0 
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 4.32. By Lemmas A.9 and A.8 and 
Proposition 3.8, we must have that for all n E N, 
+ Know( 4JOBTW( -n, - 1) ) > 
Can( (SENSE; SCANk (UOH) ) , 
Know( UOH) V Know( 7UOBTW( -n - k, 0) ) ) . 
Clearly /= 4JOBTW( 0, - 1 ), and thus by Proposition 3.3 
+ Know(4JOBTW(O, -1)); 
the desired result follows. 0 
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